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OVERVIEW
This Appendix represents the summary of the safety planning activities performed
under the contract. Modification 16 descoped these activities to be commensurate with the
level of development of the SSFP. The Preliminary Safety Analysis was developed for the
CoDR a s a Mid-term report. The information in the PSA was updated to reflect the
revisions in the SSFF Conceptual Design and new hazard reports were developed. An
additional task for configuration control, safety, and functional verification was added to
the contract. The task reads as follows:
"A Plan for Configuration Control and Safety and Functional Verification of the
integrated SSFF Flight Unit After Activities such as Experiment or Core Repair,
Experiment or Core Reconfiguration, and Experiment Changeout. The plan shall consider
use of prototype and GCEL units as well as the flight unit with instrumented samples. The
plan shall address whether equipment such as thermal probes (for calibration), furnace
borescopes, and mini-gloveboxes should be provided by the SSFF Project for the safety
and functional verification activities."
Based upon the changes in Space Station design/use configurations/concepts and
the resultant downscaling of the safety-related tasks, it was determined that an attempt at
this time to develop a plan as originally described above would be impractical. Rather, it
was decided to develop concepts upon which detailed plans will be based at a later date
when configurations and concepts will be better defined. Toward this end the following
listed concepts have been developed:
1) SSFF Configuration and Maintenance Control Concept;
2) SSFF Safety Verification Concept;
3) SSFF Functional Verification Concept
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A Preliminary Safety Analysis (PSA) is being accomplished as part of
the Space Station Furnace Facility (SSFF) contract. This analysis activity is
intended to support SSFF activities by analyzing concepts and designs as they
mature to develop essential safety requirements for inclusion in the appropriate
specifications, and designs, as early as possible. In addition, the analysis
identifies significant safety concerns that may warrant specific trade studies or
design definition, etc.
The analysis activity to date concentrated on hazard and hazard
cause identification and requirements development with the goal of developing
a baseline set of detailed requirements to support trade study, specifications
development, and preliminary design activities. The analysis activity will con-
tinue as the design and concepts mature.
Section 2 defines what was analyzed, but it is likely that the SSFF
definitions will undergo further changes. The safety analysis activity will reflect
these changes as they occur.
The analysis provides the foundation for later safety activities. The
hazards identified will in most cases have Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
applicability. The requirements and recommendations developed for each
hazard will be tracked to ensure proper and eady resolution of safety concerns.
1.1 B.UB.E.Q 
This document presents the results to date of the PSA. At this point,
emphasis is on hazard identification and requirements development as stated
above. Therefore, the format used for hazard presentation in this PSA was
developed specifically to illustrate requirements derivation as clearly as possi-
ble.
•1.2 scoPE
The PSA effort applies to all identified SSFF elements. The PSA
addresses SSFF concepts, and will eventually address GFP, related software,
and conceptual ground and flight operations including integration, trans-
portation to orbit, assembly, checkout, operation and maintenance as these
1-1
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activities and elements are identified. This document presents interim results of
the PSA within this scope. The scope of this interim effort was driven directly by
the corresponding stage of SSFF preliminary design development concepts.
Section 2 summarizes the SSFF element details available for this interim PSA
effort.
The safety analysis activity will continue after the submittal of this
document to support the remainder of the contracted SSFF activities. New
recommended requirements identified will be implemented in the appropriate
specifications and the design. Major findings of immediate importance to NASA
will be documented in correspondence. Otherwise, no further external docu-
mentation of SSFF safety analysis results is planned at this time.
1.3
The current configuration is analyzed for hazards in a top-down man-
ner. Energy sources, hazardous functions, and hazardous operations are sys-
tematically analyzed to derive a list of inherent hazards. Once the hazards are
identified, specific potential hazard causes are determined based on known
subsystem designs and operating scenarios. Lessons learned from previous
programs and related analyses (e.g., Spacelab and FMEA) will also be used to
generate or add to the list of causes as necessary.
A control or a set of controls is necessary to adequately control the
hazard for each potential hazard cause. These controls (requirements) may
affect one or more subsystems or result in interface constraints. For this PSA,
each cause was initially reviewed against current Space Station and NSTS
requirements. The three top safety requirements documents used were:
a. SS-SRD-0001, Section 3, "Space Station Systems
Requirements," On-Orbit
b. NHB 1700.7B, "NASA Safety Policy and Requirements for
Payloads Using the STS"
c. KHB 1700.7A, "STS Payload Ground Safety Handbook."
(Ground and GSE requirements will be assessed and added
later.)
_=_
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The purpose of this section is to identify what was analyzed.
Descriptions are provided to give the reader a clear understanding of the
eiements and subsystems that were covered and their key features. A complete
description of the analyzed configuration is beyond the scope of this document.
Readers of this document familiar with SSFF could proceed directly to section 3
for the results of the PSA and refer back to this section when questions on
analysis scope, etc., adse.
The SSFF configuration analyzed consists of six major elements:
• Fumace Core
• Advanced Automated Directional Solidification Furnace (AADSF)
• Crystal Growth Facility (CGF)
• Hot Wall Float Zone Furnace (HWFZ)
• Metals and Alloys Solidification Apparatus (MASA)
• Visibly Transparent Furnace (VTF).
The following sections briefly describe these elements and some of
the other relevant SSFF subsystems.
2.1 SPACE STATION FURNACE FACILITY
Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE) has begun work on the
conceptual design of the SSFF. The SSFF is a multiuser facility capable of
supporting a wide variety of experimentation in solidification physics and crystal
growth. The preliminary definition of this facility has defined a vadety of unique
furnace modules which can be integrated into a common support system and
structure for mission-particular experimentation. The SSFF will occupy the
volume equivalent to five Space Station Freedom (SSF) racks. Of this five-rack
equivalent volume, one of these racks will consist of the Furnace Core
(Avionics, etc.), and the other four will be dedicated to the Furnace Modules.
The Fumace Core is the control center for the functionally diverse Furnace
Modules. The Furnace Core will provide the resources required by the Furnace
Modules. The Furnace Modules perform the scientifically unique function
required to achieve the overall objectives of the SSFF. They are the
experiment-specific elements of the SSFF. There are several candidate
2-1
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furnaces identified for the SSFF, including (primary consideration for analysis
purposes) but not limited to the following:
• AADSF
• CGF
• HWFZ
• MASA
• v'r'F.
Other Furnace Modules will be designed and utilized over the life of
the SSFF. However, this Furnace Module set should serve as an adequate
reference payload set that will provide a comprehensive set of performance
requirements for the SSFF Fumace Core. The CGF is planned to operate in at
least four different configurations. These include the High Temperature Gradient
Directional Solidification Furnace (HTGDSF), the Low Temperature Gradient
Directional Solidification Furnace (LTGDSF), the Vapor Crystal Growth Furnace
(VCGF), and the Programmable Muitizone Fumace (PMZF).
2.1_1 Advanced Automated Directional Solidification Furnace
TBD
2.1.2 Crystal Growth Fumace and Related Conceots
The CGF, as designed for Spacelab, is a complex system of separate
but integrated components. The CGF is a SSF precursor experiment, because
it will be flown in the shuttle-based Spacelab module before assembly of the
station. The interfaces will change for the SSF version of the CGF. Also, the
SSFF Furnace Core will eliminate the need for some of the CGF subsystem
components. These design and interface issues will be detailed more
thoroughly in the "Conceptual Design" section of this report.
It is assumed that the science requirements for the SSF will be similar
to those for Space!ab missions as they pertain to the CGF. This is because the
CGF is designed to meet a specific set of science requirements, and
significantly modified science requirements would most likely necessitate major
design changes. The CGF science objectives for the SSFF era of spaceflight
will be only moderately upgraded from those used for Spacelab. These science
2-2
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objectives are obtained from the document entitled "Reconfigurable Furnace
Module Design Description," TBE document SP-DOC-6073. The
Reconfigurable Furnace Module (RFM), shown in Figure 2.1-1, is the Furnace
Core located within a modified Experiment Apparatus Container (EAC). The
RFM is the element that best reflects the science objectives of the CGF. The
primary function of the CGF is the microgravity processing of semiconductor
materials, which is achieved by applying the appropriate thermal profile to a
sample to accomplish directional solidification. The following items are the
major objectives of this research:
• To isolate and study gravity-dependent and gravity-independent
variables during the controlled solidification of electronic materials
• To produce crystals with reduced defect densities by growth in a
microgravity environment.
The CGF is designed with independent thermal control of both the hot
and cold zones in the classical Bridgman-Stockbarger furnace configuration
and can be reconfigured or modified for vapor crystal growth or programmable
multizone operation. The Bridgman-Stockbarger version can be configured for
high temperature gradient directional solidification or low temperature gradient
directional solidifrcation depending on the length of the adiabatic zone. The
addition of spacers and changes to the hot and cold zone temperatures permit
varying of the gradients. VCG and PMZF will require much more significant
modifications.
The CGF will have the capability of repeated interface demarcation
during processing through either mechanical or Peltier pulsing.
Severai types of semiconductor materials will be flown as sample
materials in the CGF. These materials include, but are not limited to, alloys in
the Cd-Te system, germanium aJloys, and GaAs.
The following paragraphs describe three different CGF operational
configurations, the HTGDSF and LTGDSF, VCGF, and PMZF.
2.1.2.1 Hiah Temoerature Gradient and Low Temoerature Gradient
Directional Solidification Furnaces - The HTGDSF and LTGDSF CGF design
consists of three distinct components, the Hot Zone, the Adiabatic Zone, and the
Cold Zone. The use of three separate stand-alone components allows for rapid
reconfiguration to suit the needs of the various users. Reconfiguration of the
2-3
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adiabatic zone allows different thermal gradients to be achieved, as shown in
Figure 2.1-2. It was noted previously that the SSFF will consist of the Furnace
Core and a selected set of Furnace Modules. The functional elements include
the following units:
• Integrated Furnace Experiment Assembly (IFEA)
• Environmental Control System
• Power Distribution System (PDS)
• Command and Data Acquisition System (CDAS)
• Power and Signal Conditioning System (PSCS)
(Recently separated into two units)
These systems-levelboxes or units perform the specific functions that
are required for all aspects of this type of microgravity crystal growth. The IFEA
consists of the RFM, the Furnace Translation System (FTS), the Sample
Exchange Mechanism (SEM), and the associated structural support, all
enclosed within a modified EAC. This exact unit makes up the majority of the
SSFF/CGF Furnace Module. However, the CGF Furnace Module will include
other functional units that are not planned to be provided by the SSFF Furnace
Core. It is"the identification of tllese functional interfaces that constitutes the
conceptual design of the SSFF.
The conceptual design of the SSFF/CGF Furnace Module requires a
detailed system-level assessment of the CGF as designed for Spacelab. Those
functions that are common to all Furnace Modules will be performed by the
SSFF Furnace Core. The remaining functions and hardware elements will be
classified as the Furnace Module. The SSFF Furnace Core will be required to
perform the functions of the PDS, the CDAS, the Environmental Control System,
and some functions currently performed by the Power Conditioning System.
The CGF Furnace Module will consist of the IFEA, the Signal Conditioning
System, and a portion of the Power Conditioning System.
The utilization of the IFEA as the heart of the SSFF/CGF Furnace
Module is obvious from its design and application in the Spacelab version of
the CGF. However, the rationale for transfer of the Signal Conditioning System
and a portion of the Power Conditioning System to the Furnace Module
classification may not be so obvious. The reason for this classification choice is
2-5
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that the conceptual design of the SSFF Furnace Core does not include
provisions for unique and specialized signal conversion; thus, this function
should be performed by a component of the Furnace Module.
Several interfaces are changed as a result of this functional
rearrangement of the existing CGF. In particular, the new interfaces of the SSFF
Fumaca Core to the CGF Furnace Module will require at least eight break-
points. The operational issues associated with this concept will be discussed
further in the "Technology Risk" section of this report.
Another design-related issue is the structural support and mounting
provisions for the CGF Furnace Module. The plan for mounting of the IFEA in
the Spacelab Module is a vertical installation on a special structure at a
Spacelab rack location, but not inside a Spacelab rack. Volumetric
considerations made this necessary. A top-level volumetric assessment of the
SSF rack indicates that the IFEA EAC would fit inside; however, the clearance
would be only 7.4 in. This would not be enough clearance for sample
changeout. However, the in-rack mounting base for the EAC could be designed
to tilt out, thus providing access to the sample insertion port and the capability
for.ampoule exchange. The only other alternative is to provide the same type of
structural accommodations as the Spacelab version of the CGF. It is not likely
that the same mounting base could be used in a SSF rack location because of
the inherent differences between SSF and Spacelab racks. A modified
Spacelab EAC mounting plate would be required for SSF if this mounting
configuration concept is used.
The resource requirements for HTGDSF and LTGDSF in the CGF
Furnace Module include a wide variety of resources that are typical of materials
processing experiments. The primary difference between the Spacelab version
of the CGF and the SSFF/CGF Furnace Module is the source of the payload
resources. In the Spacelab version of the CGF, these resources will be supplied
directly from the Spacelab carrier; however, the SSFF version of the CGF will
use the Furnace Core, which manages the resources provided by the carrier
[i.e., the United States Laboratory (USL) module] and controls the distribution of
these resources to the various Furnace Modules.
In general, the resources provided to payloads by the USL module
are similar to those provided by the Spacelab module to its payload elements.
2-7
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The USL module will have slightly increased capabilities over the Spacelab
module (other than crew time); therefore, the SSF should be capable of
providing almost all the necessary resources for the CGF Furnace Module. The
availability of the following resources needs to be verified for future versions of
this report.
• Argon distribution or bottles in the USL
• Determination of adequate water flow for thermal control
• Determination of adequate avionics air flow for thermal control.
Table 2.1-1 is a summary of the power and data interface
requirements for the CGF Furnace Module.
• 2.1.2.2 Vaoor Crystal Growth Fumace - The CGF can be configured
for vapor crystal growth quite easily. The gradients provided can drive the mass
transfer from a source crystal in the hot zone to a seed or sting in the cold zone.
Modification is primarily to the ampoule. Imaging may require much more
significant modifications as will be discussed later. The following report is part
of an effort being performed by TBE, which deals with Materials Processing in
Space (MPS) research for the SSFF contract. This is a preliminary conceptual
design of the HWFZ.
The use of the vapor crystal growth method (or chemical vapor
transport) as a method of production of semiconductor crystals in a Iow-g
environment allows scientists to better study the effects of gravity-induced
convection on vapor mass transport between the source and crystal. The vapor
crystal growth process involves establishing a thermal gradient between a
source material and a seed crystal. The thermal gradient produces a
composition gradient betweed the source and seed. Crystal growth at the seed
crystal occurs because of the vapor transport of material from the hot source
material to the cooler seed crystal. The Iow-g environment reduces or
eliminates convection cells in the vapor field, maintaining a lamellar flow field
under diffusion-controlled conditions.
The VCGF module will be designed to perform crystal growth for
technologically important semiconductor materials using the vapor crystal
growth technique. A major benefit of vapor crystal growth processing is the
production of high-quality, dislocation-free crystals of elemental or lightly doped
2-8
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TABLE 2.1-1. CGF DATA AND POWER INTERFACES
INTERFACE
Analog Inputs
Analog Outputs
Discrete Inputs
Discrete Outputs
28 Vdc Power Lines
Variable Power Lines
Serial Communications
QUANTITY
48
8
64
48
32
18
0
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semiconductors. The space-based furnace will also improve the scientific
understanding Of the role of convective flows in Earth-bound growth methods.
The furnace module will be composed of five independently
controlled heater zones to control overpressures in muiticomponent systems
and to provide the shallow temperature gradient required by the vapor diffusion
process. Ampoule wail temperature will need to be controlled to prevent
multiple nucleation of the source matedal on the ampoule wails. The module
shall also be designed to allow translation of the heater module over the
stationary sample ampoule to maintain growth interface supersaturation.
The vapor crystal growth module is currently defined as being a
modification of the Crystal Growth Furnace. The modification required for vapor
crystal growth is the replacement of the RFM with an RFM designed specifically
for vapor crystal growth. The "standard" RFM is configured as a two-zone
furnace for directional solidification using the Bddgman-Stockbarger technique.
At least five zones are necessary to provide the temperature control required for
the vapor crystal growth process. The zone temperatures will be programmed
to act as three distinct temperature regions; the tow-temperature area, the
booster heater area, and the high-temperature area. It is estimated that the
power requirements will be similar if not somewhat less then the standard CGF
configuration. No special consurhables are required for the vapor crystal
growth RFM.
The incorporation of devices for optical or thermal imaging of the
growing crystals will require an extensively modified RFM and modifications of
the IFEA. Viewing must be limited to the low-temperature zones (Crystal growth
zone) only because of the high temperatures of the other zones. The crystal
growth zone has a maximum temperature of 1100 °C, which is also the
maximum temperature of currently available visibly transparent materials such
as quartz or sapphire. Quartz may be limited to lower temperatures depending
on the vapor pressures inside the ampoule. There may also be a problem with
cold spots at the window positions.
==
The requirements that necessitate furnace modification for vapor
crystal growth are shown in Tables 2.1-2, 2.1-3, and 2.1-4.
2.1.2.3 Proorammable Multizone Furnace - The CGF can be
configu£ed to a PMZF with some major modifications. The PMZF, shown in
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TABLE 2.1-2. FURNACE PHYSICAL PARAMETERS
Sample Size:
Outer Diameter
Total Processable Length
Heated Cavity Length
Gradient Zone Length
0.5 - 3.50 cm
8.0 - 25.0 cm
35.0 cm
0.50 - 4.00 cm
TABLE 2.1-3.
Low Temperature Zone
High Temperature Zone
Booster Heater Zone
Heatup and Cooldown Rate
FUNCTIONAL AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
200 - 1100 °C
200 - 1600 °C
200 - 1650 °C
TBD
Translation Capability
Processing Rate
Control Range
0.01 to 10.0 mm/h
35.0 cm
TABLE 2.1-4. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Power requirement
Volume
Mass
Consumables
1500 W max.
900 W avg.
0.56 m3
190 kg
Argon
Approx. 0.2 m3/run
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Figure 2.1-3, is a 30-zone furnace that uses computer control to sequer_tially
control heater elements in the furnace so that a temperature gradient can be
moved through the sample without using a translation mechanism. The PMZF
does not have an adiabatic zone, and it requires individual control of each
element in the furnace. Therefore, the PMZF will require complete modification
to the IFEA. The PMZF is a project being managed by Lewis Research Center
(LeRC). The PMZF will be designed to directionaily solidify bulk single crystals
in the microgravity environment of space• While the LeRC project is currently in
a very early stage of development, this report is based on information obtained
from Bruce Rosenthal, the PMZF project engineer at LeRC, and data on other
furnaces currently under development, coupled with the science requirements
in the SCRD.
The PMZF will be designed to accommodate alloys, semiconductors,
and other materials that require controlled low-temperature gradients between
two nearly isothermal temperature regions. The PMZF will be a resistance-
heated furnace capable of producing samples approximately 3 cm in diameter
and 30 cm in length. The design will allow for the adaptation to the individual
user's samples and be capable of maintaining a solidification front in an
optimum position for obtaining a planar interface.
The elimination of gravity-driven convection in space make._ it an
ideal environment for processing single crystals. This technique is vital to the
design and fabrication of modem electronic devices since the primary objective
is to produce materials that are homogeneous in composition and have perfect
crystal structures.
The principal goal in bulk crystal growth techniques is to generate a
thermal gradient to produce a planar liquid-solid interface in the sample and to
translate this interface along the length of the sample material to yield a single
crystal. The Bridgman-Sto.ckbarger thermal configuration limits growth to only
one direction using linear temperature gradients. The translation of the
temperature gradients in the conventional Bridgman furnaces is usually
performed by moving the furnace in relation to the sample and vice versa. This
translation may cause disturbances in the growth front of the crystals, and
elimination of these disturbances would allow more nearly homogeneous
crystals to be produced. The PMZF will reduce these disturbances.
V
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FIGURE 2.1-3. PROGRAMMABLE MULTIZONE FURNACE (Sheet 1 of 2)
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FIGURE 2.1-3. PROGRAMMABLE MULTIZONE FURNACE (_heet 2 of 2)
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As stated eadier, the PMZF produces temperature gradients through a
series of connected temperature zones and translates these gradients by
coordinated sequencing of the zone temperatures. Therefore, the CGF
configuration would need to be drastically modified to incorporate this method.
The magnitude of the temperature gradient must be limited for many materials
because of thermal stress effects, and, therefore, a very low growth velocity
must be employed. The PMZF version is limited to low-temperature gradients
because of the indirect furnace-to-sample thermal coupling needed to blend the
discrete zones. The PMZF will consume more power than customary Bridgman
furnaces because every zone must be capable of providing the high cooling
rates needed to achieve the maximum desired temperature drops. This high
heat loss could restrict SSFF applications. The ability of the PMZF to translate
its thermal gradients through the use of a control mechanism would eliminate
the need for a large furnace translation device. Typical power consumed by the
CGF translation system is 350 W/run. The PMZF will only require a motor t.o
insert and withdraw the ampoule from the furnace, and, therefore, much less
power will be required to provide the effect of translation.
The PMZF will require several supporting subsystems. These may
include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Control System
• Power Distribution System
• Thermal Control System
• Ampoule Leak Detection System
• Data Acquisition System
• Ampoule Insertion and Removal System
• PurgeNent System
• Experimental Apparatus Container.
The PMZF will contain between 20 and 30 individual heating zones,
and each zone will be approximately 1 in. high. With the addition of booster
heaters at the top and bottom of the furnace to reduce heat loss, the furnace will
be approximately 40 in. thick. The temperature range of the furnace will be
0 to 1500 °C. Thermal gradients achieved by the furnace should be
._30 °C/cm. The maximum gradient velocity achieved in a similar furnace in an
RE-717 report titled "Developmental Testing of a Programmable Multizone
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Furnace," was 10 in./h. Each zone of the furnace will contain two
platinum/rhodium heating elements that were chosen for their high temperature
strength and oxidation resistance.
Temperature accuracy is a critical factor in the design of the PMZF.
Without highly accurate thermocouples, the desired temperature gradients and
their motions cannot be obtained. The properties that are essential to
thermocouple performance depend to a large extent on the temperature range
in which the furnace is to operate. Type K thermocouples (Chromel-Alumel)
can be used from 0 to 1250 °C. Type S thermocouples (platinum-platinum/10%
rhodium) can be used from 0 to 1450 °C. Type B thermocouples (platinum/30%
rhodium-platinum/6% rhodium) can be used from 800 to 1700 °C. All three of
these exhibit good oxidation resistance in their operating range as well as'high
EMF output over that range. However, outside their temperature range and as
they age, these thermocouples will display some degradation in performance.
Therefore, Type S thermocouples would be best suited for SSFF applications.
The inability to determine the exact temperature at a zone will prevent the
establishment of an exact gradient.
At full power, each element of the RE-717 furnace required 132 W.
Therefore, each zone would require 264 W, and, with up to 34 zones including
booster zones, the entire furnace would require approximately 9 kW. This
measurement was based on a voltage at the heating element of 2.2 Vac and a
measured element current of 60 A during full furnace power. If only 8 zones (12
with boosters) were used in the furnace, about 3.1 kW is required. Time
proportioned (duty cycle) power control was used, which pulses the power to
the heating elements at a rapid rate so that an average power level was
achieved over time. According to RE-717, there is no reason, other than cost,
why another power control method such as voltage proportionation cannot be
used to reduce the peak-power demand.
The thermal averaging, which will be needed to smooth the effect of
discrete heating zones, will mean that cooling cannot be localized. In the test
furnace used by RE-717 with a 0.5-in. diameter sample, temperature gradients
up to approximately 75 °C/in. were achieved with a stainless steel sample and
30 °CAn. with a copper sample. The magnitude of the gradient is limited by the
amount of axially conducted heat that can be lost radially. Minimum gradients
are limited by the accuracy of the control system since the gradient produced is
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no better than the temperature sensors used to create it. Because of errors in
the thermocouples, the lower limit would be approximately 6 °C/in. at 750 °C.
The gradient velocity's upper limit is dependent on the cooling rate of
the zones, the operating temperature, the gradient magnitude, and the sample
conductivity. Thermal gradient velocities of 10 in./h were achieved in the RE-
717 fumace using low conductivity materials (<16 W/me). The lower limit of the
gradient velocity is dependent on the time-temperature stability and accuracy of
the system. With room temperature changes of 5 °C in 5 h, a gradient of
20 "C/in., and 10 percent precision in gradient velocity, RE-717 achieved a
lower limit of 0.075 in./h. The lower limit may be unacceptably high at low
temperatures where temperature oscillations occur more frequently because of
inadequate control resolution.
Resource requirements for the PMZF are shown in Table 2.1-5.
2.1.3 Hot Wall Float Zone Furnace
The use of the floating zone method as a technique for containerless
processing of semiconductor materials in a Iow-g environment allows scientists
to better study thermocapiilary flows, meniscus shapes and stability, and
transport processes. The floating zone crystal growth process ihvolves passing
a polycrystailine rod of sample matedal through a circumferential heat source
which is above the melting temperature of the sample. As the rod passes
through the heated zone, a molten zone forms just ahead of the heater and is
resolidified into a single crystal rod at the rear of the heater. The shape of the
molten zone is determined by the actions of the surface tension that holds the
meniscus in place ag_nst gravitational and dynamic forces. As the force of
gravity is reduced, the size of the molten section can be enlarged, and the
meniscus will have a more desirable shape. The Iow-g environment will provide
benefits to float zone processing as follows:
• Undistorted zones may be processed in materials with low surface
tensions.
• Buoyancy-driven convection is reduced.
• Quiescent heating may be used to eliminate violent stirring
associated with R-F heating.
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TABLE 2.1-5.
Power:
Thermal Cooling:
Heated Cavity Control:
Processing Gas:
(purge/vent)
Data: 30-zone fumace
IN'.
Analog (I/Fs):
Digital (l/Fs):
Sedal (I/Fs):
OUT-.
Analog (l/Fs):
Digital (I/Fs):
Sedal (I/Fs):
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
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9 kW (34 zones)
3.1 kW (12 zones)
8 kW (includes cooling for subsystems)
:1:1% over length of zone
Argon
Peak No. of Channels
0.03 Mbps 30
0.03 Mbps 120
0.03 Mbps 3
0.1 Mbps 1 80
0.1. Mbps 480
0.1 Mbps 6
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Stoichiometry may be preserved by use of liquid phase
encapsulants and pressurized growth chambers. This practice is
normally used on Earth for Czochralski growth, but is not suited for
float zone geometry in Earth's gravity.
• Modeling of heat flow may be tailored to produce optimum growth
interface shapes.
• Surface tension will still present a problem but can be controlled
by lowering axial gradients using liquid phase encapsulants or
applying magnetic fields.
The HWFZ furnace module will be designed to perform zone
purification/refinement and crystal growth in a hot wall chamber for
technologically important materials using the float zone technique. One benefit
of the float zone processing is the production of high-quality, dislocation-free
crystals of elemental or lightly doped "semiconductor materials. Also, this
furnace can be used for purification and/or refinement of metals, alloys, and
glasses. This is a result of a solidification front which passes down the length of
the sample. As it does so, impurities present in the material cannot overcome
the energy present at the solid-liquid interface and they are therefore pushed
down. the length of the sample. After several passes, the sample will be
relatively free of impurities, except for one end which can be removed. The
HWFZ will, in the future, have the ability to perform the following experiments:
• Float Zone Crystal Growth
• Float Zone Purification of Materials
• Directional Solidification
• Crystallization Phenomena Studies.
The HWFZ will allow for the characterization of Marangoni flows, driven by
surface tension differences within the melt. The influence of the absence of
buoyancy flows on the grown crystal and the characterization of Marangoni
flows will be used to:
• Determine what improvements can be made in crystals grown in
microgravity conditions as compared to crystals grown on Earth
• Predict the size limits (rod diameter and length) for which
improvements can be expected
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• Obtain better understanding of the relative roles of buoyancy and
Marongoni flows in Earth-bound growth methods, such as float
zone and Czochralski crystal growth of silicon and other materials.
The HWFZ furnace module will have up to five temperature zones to
control the overpressures of multicomponent systems. It will be designed to
provide peltier pulsing and mechanical pulsing to the translation system to
demarcate the solid-liquid interface, and thermal and optical imaging devices to
fumish real-time observations. The HWFZ module will be capable of providing
precise control of heater elements, measuring and recording of the furnace
temperatures, translation rates, and sample position relative to the furnace
module. This allows larger diameter materials to be processed by keeping the
feed and growth rods near the melting point. HWFZ processing requires both
ends of the sample to be aligned relative to one another during processing.
Therefore, this furnace module must utilize a sample translation device with
differential feed-rod/growth-rod translation capability mounted to each end of
the sample. The furnace module will also use a differential rate opposing
direction sample rotation system. The sample rotation mechanism will be used
to rotate the sample at a set rate during the process phase. Rotation of the
sample is required to allow for a uniform distribution of heat during the process
phase and for proper movement of the molten zone. The sample must be
contained within a cartridge to prevent any evaporated or liquid sample material
from coming into contact with the furnace core. A conceptual design of the
HWFZ is illustrated in Figures 2.1-4 and 2.1-5.
The HWFZ furnace will require several supporting subsystems, which
are listed below:
• Purge/Vent
• Experimental Apparatus Container
• ComputEr Control
• Sample Insertion/Removal
• Data _.cquisition
• Leak Detection
• Power Distribution
• Thermal Control.
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The HWFZ furnace physical parameters, functional and performance
requirements, and resource requirements are shown in Tables 2.1-6, 2.1-7, and
2.1-8, respectively.
2.1.4 Visibly Transoarent Furnace
Current research in areas of high temperature crystal growth and
directional solidification is usually limited to opaque furnaces to minimize heat
losses. Because of this limitation, it is difficult to study the solidification process
and the effect of processing parameters on interface morphology in real time.
Science objectives on some experiments require active monitoring of the solid-
liquid interface shape as a feedback loop to the process controller. Transparent
furnaces allow the active monitoring of the interface shape and morphology for
scientific study or process control.
The Visibly 'Transparent Furnace facility will be composed of the
transparent furnace module, which will use the following SSFF subsystems:
• Temperature display system
• Video processing system .
• Controller and data acquisition system
• Thermal control system interface
• Crew alert system
• Power conditioning and distribution.
2.1.4.1 Heatina System - A conceptual design for the furnace core
is illustrated in Figure 2.1-6. The thermal gradient is established by multiple
heating element zones wound in a series of stacked quartz muffle tubes. The
heater core will be composed of eight or more independently heated zones.
The zones are separated by thin ceramic baffles, which prevent reflections
between adjacent zones. It is estimated that the total power requirements for
the heaters will be approximately 1,500 W. The total heater zone length will be
20 in. and the internal diameter of the hot zone will be 1.5 in. An alternate
configuration using an insulated hot zone section is shown in Figure 2.1-7.
2.1.4.2 Translation System - The module should be designed for
furnace zone translation over a stationary sample to minimize any accelerations
imparted to the sample by drive mechanism noise or translation rate changes.
Furnace translation also reduces the complexity of incorporating a sample
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TABLE 2.1-6. FURNACE PHYSICAL PARAMETERS
Outer Diameter
Total Processable Length
Heated Cavity Length:
Zone Length:
Dioital Control Data:
RTDs
Furnace Atmosphere
Coolant Water
Thermocouples
Each heater element
Sample ampoule
Translation motors -
Coolant loop
.=
Pressure Transducers
Coolant pressure drop
Vacuum gauge
Other Sensors
Humidity sensors
Cartridge failure
Limit switches
Toxic offgas sensors
Motor drives
Resolution
Number of Channels
Avg. Data Rate of sensors
Peak Data Rate (motor drives)
Video data rate
0.50 - 3.0 cm
8.0 - 25.0 cm
35.0 cm
0.20 - 10.0 cm
4
4
4
4
2
6
4
2
4
4
5
5
3
0.1 °C
53
5 samples/sec
40,000 samples/sec
528 x 380 x 8 x 30
=48 Mbps
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TABLE 2.1-7. FUNCTIONAL AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Experiment Timeline Up to 90 days
Heated Cavity ODeratin _ RarlqR
Feed and growth zones
Hot wall zone
200 - 1200 oC
200 - 1600 °C
Heated Cavity_ Control
Roat Zone
Feed and Growth Zones
TBD
TBD
Translation Capability
Rate
Differential feed-rod/growth-rod
Translation Rate
TBD
TBD
Rotation Caoability
Differential Rate Opposing Direction
Cooling Requirements
TBD
TBD
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Power 1500 W avg.
3100 W peak
Voltage 28 Vdc
Volume .32 m3
Mass -200 kg
Vacuum/Vent 10 E-3 Torr
Thermal Control
Avionics Air
Cooling Water
310 W
2.8 kW
Consumables
Inert Gas
Samples
Argon
TBD
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agitation system. Translation of the furnace core requires a system to feed the
power and instrumentation leads to the furnace core area during translation.
The scheme envisioned for lead wire routing in this concept is shown in
Figures 2.1-6 and 2.1-8. Both power and thermocouple leads are channeled
through grooves in the IR baffles to conduits spanning between the furnace core
endplates. Rexible umbilicals will then route the leads to the furnace module
housing endplates. The drive system will employ a "traditional" lead screw and
guide rod system. The translation system should have a step resolutior_ of at
least 1 micron. Translation rates will vary from 0.5 cm/day to 50 cm/day. Rapid
translation capability is required. Microstepping capability is not required on the
rapid translation motor.
2.1.4.3 Heat Shieldina - An IR reflector or shield is considered to
be a necessity on this type of furnace to conserve power. The shield used
would probably be a gold-coated quartz tube, transparent to visible light, bLJt
reflecting IR.
2.1.4.4 _- The furnace will need to be enclosed by an
additional vessel for safety (three levels of containment) and waste heat
extraction. This will require the use.of a video camera system for viewing the
sample (as opposed to looking through three layers of windows from the
outside). It is desirable to place the camera as close as possible to the sample
ampoule in the event high magnification is required. Several options exist for
placement of the camera with respect to the thermal cooling jacket. The first
option places the camera inside the cooling jacket adjacent to the heater core.
The optics and camera will require a thermal control system because of the
proximity to the furnace core. The second option places the camera outside of
the cooling jacket in the space between the jacket and the EAC. The camera
will view the interface through a window in the cooling jacket. A third option,
shown in Figure 2.1-8, places the cooling jacket on the translating furnace core.
The camera will be located outside of the jacket and will view the sample
through a window in the jacket. This option requires that an additional level of
containment be added since the cooling jacket no longer serves this purpose
due to the exposed ends of the ampoule. This configuration may also require a
booster heater around the viewing window to prevent heating dissymmetry.
This configuration also places the camera further from the furnace. The
containment could be in the form of extension bellows on the ends of the
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translating furnace core or a second wall surrounding the furnace core
translation envelope, The second and third options place severe limitations on
viewing flexibility but eliminate the problem of isolating the camera from heat.
The camera will require a translation system for axial positioning along the
sample. The camera support will also need to be gimballed for tilt. In some low
temperature systems, a light may be needed for illumination of the solid-liquid
interface.
2.1.4.5 Furnace Geometrv - The translating heater zone
configuration may require the furnace to translate up to approximately 1.5 times
the usable sample length depending on the thermal gradient established by the
heater zones and the experimental parameters. If the usable sample length is
15 in., at least 20 in. is required between the translation stops. It is estimated
that the entire furnace module assembly will be 55 in. high and 18 in. in
diameter. A conceptual design for the furnace module is shown in Figure 2.1-8.
2.1.4.6 Temoerature Measurement - Three thermocouples, spaced
in 120-deg radial increments, will be required for each zone. An 8-zone furnace
will therefore require 24 thermocouples. It is estimated that an additional 20
thermocouples will be required for sample instrumentation and various other
furnace temperature measurements raising the total thermocouple count to 80.
A setpoint stability of ¢-0.5 °C is desired for temperature control. The required
setpoint resolution is 0.1 =C. RTDs will be required to achieve this degree of
resolution. Two RTDs will be used for measurement of the furnace module
intedor temperature. A non-contact temperature measurement system for direct
solid-liquid interface temperature measurement is desirable but is a technology
development issue. Absorption by the quartz ampoule limits current optical
pyrometers. Optical pyrometry is not specified in the CRD.
Table 2.1-9 lists the resource requirements for the Visibly Transparent
Furnace, while Table 2.1-10 shows sensor and control requirements.
2.1.5 Metals and Alloys Solidification Aooaratus
The MASA is a Bddgman-type furnace which provides the capability
for controlled directional solidification experiments on metals," alloys, and
composites in the microgravity environment. The furnace system employs a
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TABLE 2.1-9. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Power
Instrumentation voltage
Thermal Cooling Load
Consumables
Vacuum
1500 W at 28 Vdc
TBD
1500 W (90% liquid, 10% air)
Argon will be required for backfill, approximately
150 liters/run
The furnace will need to be evacuated after each run,
assuming that the furnace module does not
incorporate a multiple sample exchange system.
Video
Process Times
Approximately 512 x 512 pixel density at 1 frame per
second in color
Up to 10 days, processing + controlled cooldown
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TABLE 2.1-10. TRANSPARENT FURNACE SENSOR
AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS (Sheet 1 of 3)
Heater Control
• 8 zones, 8 heaters, 8 heater drivers
• Up to 200 W per zone
• 800 °C maximum temperature
• :I:.1 =C setpoint stability
Thermocouple Placement
• Thermocouples, spaced 120 deg apart, 1
24 thermocouples in the furnace core
• 2 thermocouples located in the sample ampoule
set of three per zone
• Drive motor thermocouples, 4 motors, 1 thermocouple per motor,
4 thermocouples total
• Coolant loop thermocouples, 6 total
• "Structural" temperatures sensors, 1 on each heater core end cap, 3 on
cooling jacket, 4 thermocuples total
• 2 camera temperature thermocouples
• 42 thermocouples total
Two Humidity Sensors
Position Measurement
• 1 linear potentiometer-fumace position
• 2 optical encoders
• 1 rotary potentiometer-camera position
micron furnace position measurement resolution• 1
R'I'D
• 2
• 2
• 1
furnace atmosphere temperature sensors
coolant water temperature sensors
R'i'D/zone; 8 in furnace core
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TABLE 2.1-10. TRANSPARENT FURNACE SENSOR
AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS (Sheet 2 of 3)
Limit Switches
• 2 on furnace core translation system
• 1 on furnace core latch-down system
• 2 on furnace camera translation system
* 1 on camera latch-down system
• "Ampoule in place • verification sensor
Pressure Sensors
• 2 sensors for coolant pressure drop
. 1 vacuum gauge
• 1 backfill gas pressure sensor
Solenoid Valves
1 valve on coolant supply
1 valve on coolant return
1 valve on vacuum line
1 valve on backfill gas supply
• Verification sensors on all valves
Video Requirements
• Standard "IV frame rate and pixel density is acceptable
TOTAL NUMBER OF SENSORS:
42 thermocouples
o
I
2 humidity sensors
12 RTDs
6 limit switches
4 fluid pressure sensors - analog output
2 ampoule failure detection sensors - resistance measurement
10 current and voltage sensors on heater drivers
5 verification sensors - discrete outputs
2 potentiometer position sensors
2 optical encoder position sensors
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TABLE 2.1-10. TRANSPARENT FURNACE SENSOR
AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS (Sheet 3 of 3)
Outputs:
8 heater drivers
4 solenoid valves
2 motor controls for driving 2 steppers in microstepping mode - 4 phase
1 dc motor control for rapid translation motor
1 falisafe brake
2 hold-down solenoids
2 standard brakes
Rates
• 10-Hz sampling on thermocouples and RTDs
• 1-Hz video frame rate
Total Inputs and Outputs
• Analog 3atlHz
78 at 10 Hz
• Discrete 15at10Hz
5at1 Hz
• Special 2atl0Hz
2 at 20 Hz
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"rapid quench* capability which provides a 100 °C quench rate in 1-cm
diameter samples. The furnace system has a maximum temperature capability
of 1600 °C.
The objective of the MASA is to maximize sample throughput since
the solidification rates required for metals and alloys experiments are often of
the order of centimeters or millimeters per minute.
The MASA module consists of a fumace with a hot zone, an adiabatic
layer, and a cold zone. A negative pressure difference between the canister
and the lab environment can be maintained. The furnace has a 3-cm bore. The
hot zone has a length of 18 cm and its temperature can be varied from 300 °C to
1600 °C. There are three independently controlled heaters in the hot zone
including a 1700 °C booster heater.
A 5-cm long quench zone is adjacent to the cold zone. The quench
zone facilitates a 100 °C per second quench rate in 1-cm diameter samples.
Configured for Spacelab, the system contains a 2800 cm 3 water supply which is
filled before each run. The quench water is driven from the tank by expansion
of an internal bladder caused by argon pressure.
Sample diameters are variable up to 2 cm. For safety within the lab,
the samples are contained in sealed sample canisters. Steep thermal gradients
can be achieved with 1-cm diameter samples during directional solidification.
During directional solidification and quench, the MASA uses furnace translation
rather than sample translation to minimize induced accelerations to the sample.
A schematic of the complete MASA system within a U. S. standard equipment
rack is shown in Figure 2.1-9.
Furnace translation rate is variable from 0.36 mm/h to 3,600 mm/h.
The translation system distance of travel is sufficient to allow for insertion and
removal of the sample and position it in the hot zone center. The apparatus
includes a mechanism for automated sample oscillation during hot soak.
The furnace is installed within an environmental canister for
containment of toxi(: vapors.
The MASA module configured for the Spacelab is controlled by a
Dedicated Experiment Processor (DEP) which serves as the electric/electronic
interface with the Spacelab CDAS. Power is delivered to the DEP from the rack
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FIGURE 2.1-9. MASA RACK LAYOUT
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EPSP. The DEP may be programmed to respond to commands from tl'ie
Experiment Computer (EC) and provide power to the operating subsystems and
equipment.
Program instructions to the DEP may be entered through the
$pacelab experiment computer keyboard and transmitted via the experiment
Remote Acquisition Unit (RAU) to the DEP. Uplink command data is also
transferred through the experiment RAU to the DEP. Experiment output data is
offloaded to the Spacelab High Rate Multiplexer (HRM) where it is passed on to
the High Data Rate Recorder (HE)RR) or downlinked to the ground. These
interfaces are shown in Figure 2.1-10.
The functions of the EC, RAU, HDRR, HRM, and EPSP will be
provided by the SSFF Core Facility. The functions of the DEP will be split
between the MASA module electronics and the SSFF Core Facility.
Q
The resource requirements for MASA, as shown in Table 2.1-11, were
derived from the most recent available data on the system.
2.1.6 Maanetic Suooression Swtem Conceots
In the processing of metals, oxides, glasses, and electronic materials,
the reduced gravity of space offers the opportunity to produce materials with
unique or improved properties. This is especially true in crystal growth because
the reduction of gravity-driven flows could potentially result in higher quality
crystals which can be used in electronic devices to enhance their performance.
It is desired to ultimately produce commercial scale samples which may range
up to 10 cm in diameter. For samples this size, it is expected that the effects of
gravity-driven convection will be significant even in the reduced gravity
environment in space. For this reason, it is desired to further reduce the effects
of gravity through the use of magnetic suppression, which involves performing
the sample processing in the presence of a magnetic field in a direction parallel
to the solidification axis of the sample.
The approach to performing this study involves a consideration of
different types of magnet systems which have been classified into three
categories: (1) superconducting magnet systems, (2) normal electromagnet
systems, and (3) permanent magnet systems. Concepts from each category are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
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The mass properties of the equipment in the
MASA are given in Table 2.1-12. The furnace
module and necessary electronics and interface
equipment are expected to fit into a U.S.
standard equipment rack.
The maximum power required for the MASA
furnace is 1200 W. The average power is
800 W during an experiment operating cycle.
The MASA is designed to use 28 Vdc.
Heat is dissipated from the furnace into the
module liquid coolant loop. The liquid coolant
loop is also required to control the temperature
in the fumace cold block via a water/water heat
exchanger. The heat rejection from the sample
to the cold block is nominally 350 W while the
furnace is being operated. The furnace canister
water jacket requires coolant from the module
coolant loop also.
The peak heat removal capability required from
the avionics loop is approximately 400 W.
The quench operation uses an SSFF Core
provided source of quench water. The quench
operation requires nominally 280 cm3 for 14 sec
during each quench. The quench supply
pressure requirement ranges from 15-50 psi.
Waste argon gas released by the furnace
canister during pressure relief will be routed to
the SSFF Ruids Distribution System.
The Input/Output (I/O) channel definition for the
MASA is shown in Table 2.1-13. The control.
systems monitored and controlled by the SSFF
Core and the anticipated data rates required for
furnace operation are shown in Tables 2.1-14,
2.1-15, 2.1-16, and 2.1-17. The total number of
channels is 58, the average sampling rate is 20
samples/sec, and the average data rate is 650
kb/sec. The translation motor drive is expected
to have a data rate of 40,000 samples/sec.
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MASA EQUIPMENT MASS PROPERTIES
EQUIPMENT ITEM
MASA Apparatus
Support Frame
Sample Canister Stowage
TOTAL
MASS
(kg)
(Estimated)
i
100
i
3O
i
TBD
i
130+
i
ffEM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
TABLE 2.1-13. MASA I/O CHANNEL DEFINITION
IDENTIFICATION
i
Analog Inputs
Analog Outputs
Discrete Inputs
Discrete Outputs
TTL Inputs (Encoder)
Type-B Thermocouples Inputs
Type-K Thermocouples
RS-232 I/O
RANGE
"0-5 Vdc
0-2.5 Vdc
28 Vdc
28 Vdc
5 Vdc
•:1700 °C
<_00 °C
N/A
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TABLE 2.1-14. MASA MOTOR CONTROL MONITORS
ITEM
1
2
3
4
5
6
IDENTIFICATION
Brushless dc Motor
Brushless dc Motor
d¢ Motor Controller(s)
Optical Encoder
Limit Switch
Limit Switch
IDENTIFICATION
Furnace Translation
Sample Insertion
Control of dc Motors
Furnace Position Indication
Sample-in-Place Indication
Furnace Home, Extreme
Travel Indication
QTY
2
1
3
1
1
2
TABLE 2.1-15. MASA THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM DATA REQUIREMENTS
ITEM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
IDENTIFICATION
Booster Heater TIC
Main Heater TIC
Trim Heater T/C
Sample T/C
Current Sensor
Chamber T/C
Argon Atmosphere T/C
QTY
2
2
2
6
3
1
1
SAMPLES/sec
1-40
1-40
1-40
1-40
1-40
1
1
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MASA WATER LOOP BLOCK DATA REQUIREMENTS
ITEM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
IDENTIFICATION
ii
Cooling Water Inlet Flow Meter
Cold Block Water Inlet Flow Meter
Cold Block Water Outlet Flow Meter
Cold Block Pump
Cold Block Heat Exchanger
Cooling Water Inlet Check Valve
-SAMPLES/sec
1
1
1
N/A
N/A
1
Cooling Water Inlet T/C
Water Jacket Outlet T/C
Heat Exchanger Outlet T/C
Cold Block Water Inlet T/C
Cold Block Water Outlet T/C
2-43
TABLE 2.1-17.
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
MASA ENVIRONMENTAL BLOCK DATA REQUIREMENTS
ITEM
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
IDENTIFICATION SAMPLES/sec
Argon Supply Pressure Transducer
Chamber Argon Pressure Regulator for Inlet
Chamber Argon Pressure Regulator for Outlet
Enable Chamber Argon in Valve
Chamber P_essure Transducer
Quench Water Supply Pressure Regulator
20
N/A
N/A
N/A
2O
N/A
Enable Quench Water Valve
Argon Supply Shutoff Valve
Enable Quench Control Line Valve
Quench Exhaust Line Relief Valve
Enable Quench Exhaust to Vent Line
Enable Vacuum Vent Valve
Quench Water Inlet T/C
Furnace Canister Argon T/C
Furnace Canister Surface T/C
Quench Inlet Water Pressure
NIA
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
20
2O
20
20
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Maonetic Field Shield Desian
Because of the requirements limiting magnetic field emissions from
payloads on the SSF, it is necessary to use a magnetic field shield in
conjunction with the magnet in the magnetic suppression concept since the
magnitude of the flux desired (2,000 gausses) is far greater that the anticipated
limiting value on emissions. For dc fields, a magnetic field shield provides a
low-reluctance path for the magnetic flux being shielded. The attenuation or
shielding efficiency of a magnetic shield is the ratio of the measured field befor_
shielding to that measured after shielding. In general, magnetic shields that are
cylindrical provide greater attenuation than shapes with square corners. For
cylindrical shields, the attenuation is inversely proportional to the inside
diameter of the shield, thus the larger the volume of the shielding chamber the
lower its attenuation for a given thickness of shielding material.
In magnetic field shield construction, it is desirable to select a material
with a high permeability for high attenuation and a high saturation level. Above
saturation, shielding effectiveness drops exponentially. A typical material used
in the construction of magnetic field shields is mu-metal. Mu-metal is an alloy of
nickel, copper, chromium, and iron. It has a maximum permeability of 100,000
and a saturation induction of 6,500 gausses. In this study, mu-metal is
considered for the magnetic field shield construction as well as two alloys which
are commercially available and will be referred to here as "Alloy 1" and
"Alloy 2." The properties of interest of these alloys are presented in
Table 2.1-18. "Alloy 1" has a very high permeability for maximum attenuation,
but a low saturation level. "Alloy 2" has a relatively low permeability, but a high
saturation level. The B/H curves for the three magnetic shielding materials
considered in this study are presented in Figures 2.1-11, 2.1-12, and 2.1-13.
Using the given properties and B/H curves, the performance of each
material was evaluated in this study. Figure 2.1-14 shows a plot of the level of
magnetic flux emitted by a magnetic shield as a function of the shield thickness
for the three alloys under consideration. The magnetic flux emitted by the shield
is the flux level after shielding. This plot was produced for an interference field
of 2,000 gausses and a shield inside diameter of 44 cm. From this plot, at an
emitted flux level of 0.3 gauss, "Alloy 1" requires the smallest shield thickness,
which is mainly because it has the highest permeability. "Alloy 1" is selected
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TABLE 2.1-18. MAGNETIC FIELD SHIELD MATERIAL PROPERTIES
Specific Gravity
Saturation Induction, Gauss
Maximum Permeability
Coercive Force, Oe
Curie Temperature, °C
Mu-Metal
8.5
6,500
100,000
O.O5
4O0
"Alloy 1"
8.74
7,500
450,000
0.015
454
"Alloy 2"
7.86
21,000
4,000
1.0
770
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here as the material for the shield construction, and, for this alloy, the level of
magnetic flux after shielding is plotted as a function of shield thickness for
various shield inside diameters in Figure 2.1-15. This plot was developed for
an interference field of 2,000 gausses. Thus, this figure can be used to
determine the required shield thickness for various shield sizes. Figure 2.1-16
is a plot of the resulting shield mass versus the shield thickness for various
shield inside diameters. This plot was developed for an interference field of
2,000 gausses also. Figure 2.1-17 is a plot of the minimum shield thickness
required to avoid matedai saturation as a function of the shield inside diameter
for various source or interference flux values.
Su_erconductina Maanet System Conceot
The superconducting magnet concept consists of three major
assemblies: the magnet and dewar, a closed-cycle refrigerator, and a power
supply and control system.
The dewar has a clearance bore to permit the insertion of a crystal
growing furnace module in its center. The dewar is equipped with fixtures to
allow liquid helium and liquid nitrogen filling and venting. The dewar is also
plumbed to allow connections to the closed-cycle refrigerator. The magnet
resides in a helium-filled chamber which is maintained at 4.2 OK. To minimize
helium consumption, the magnet chamber is surrounded by a radiation shield
which is stored in liquid nitrogen and maintained at 20 °K. The outer surface of
the dewar is maintained at room temperature. The dewar is instrumented with
temperature sensors attached to the radiation shields and the magnet chamber.
The U.S. standard SSF rack will not accommodate the dewar; therefore,
nonrack provisions must be made for it.
The magnet is a solenoid, typically wound using conductors made of
many filaments of superconductor embedded in a copper matrix and twisted
along its axis to decrease its diamagnetism. Insulation is provided by the
insulation on the wire and by epoxy between each turn. The magnet is wound
on a cylinder made of aluminum, brass, or stainless steel.
P
The closed-cycle refrigerator is used to maintain the radiation shields
at 20 °K. It is attached to the top of the dewar by an armored cable. Terrestrial
refrigerators are air-cooled. The refrigerator can be installed in a U.S. standard
SSF rack.
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The magnet controls and instrumentation and power supplies can be
installed into a standard U.S. rack.
The resource requirements presented in Table 2.1-19 are based on
an actual terrestrial state-of-the-art superconducting magnet system using a 5 K
Gauss magnet. This system is manufactured by a leading supplier of
superconducting magnet systems and cryogenic accessories.
Permanent Maonet System Concept
study.
permanent magnets, it was concluded that the only way that a permanent
magnet could be used in this application is by placing the magnet in a magnetic
circuit. To use a permanent magnet alone with no circuit, to produce a
2,000-gauss magnetic field at the required distance from the magnet surface,
would require a very massive magnet, and it did not appear to be a viable
option. In this concept, the magnetic circuit considered is shown in
Figure 2.1-18. In this circuit, the magnet has a rectangular cross-section, and
pole pieces of-mild steel are used to direct the flux to the working gap where the
furnace module is placed. The length of the gap must be sufficient to
accommodate the overall length of the furnace module. In this concept, a
furnace module with an outside diameter of 20 cm and an overall length of
50 cm is considered.
Even though permanent magnets seem physically simple, their
operational complexities are evident when the factors that affect the
performance of magnets are considered. There are few sources of practical,
published information to provide the necessary expertise in magnetics. Some
of the factors that affect the performance of permanent magnets are: the magnet
material, size, and shape; location of the magnet in the circuit; level of
magnetization; location of the poles; magnetization before or after placement in
the circuit; material of which poles are made; shape of the pole pieces;
environmental conditions such as temperature, shock, and demagnetizing
fields; the material making up the part on which the magnet acts; and the size of
the part on which the magnet acts.
Concepts for using a permanent magnet have been examined in this
From literature on the subject and discussions with manufacturers of
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• TABLE 2.1-19. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Mass and Volume Requirements
Power Requirements
Consumables
Venting
The inner bore of the dewar is 86.36 cm
• in diameter and the outside diameter is
163.20 cm. This inner bore dimension is
expected to be large enough to
accommodate the furnace modules in
the SSFF study and allow room for
additional insulation around the furnace
module if necessary to decrease
nitrogen and helium consumption by the
magnet system. The dewar and magnet
weigh 6,000 lb. The closed-cycle
refrigerator is expected to fit into a
standard rack and weighs 140 lb. The
power supply and control system will
weigh 298 lb.
The magnet must be energized before
operation. The electrical power to
energize the magnet is 1.6 kW, and the
time to energize the magnet is 30 min.
After the magnet is energized, it can be
switched to a persistent mode where
there is no power requirement. The
closed-cycle refrigerator requires 1.5 kW
continuously. It is estimated that the
power supply and control system will
consume about 500 W continuously.
As heat is absorbed by the system, the
liquid nitrogen and liquid helium in the
system will vaporize and must be
replaced periodically. The liquid
nitrogen consumption rate is
approximately 4 L/h and the liquid
helium consumption rate is approxi-
mately 200 mL/h.
The helium and nitrogen gases from the
magnet system must be vented if not
captured and stored for reuse.
Provisions must be made for rapid
venting in the case of loss of cooling or
some other catastrophic event since the
magnet system will have a large amount
of stored energy.
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In this study, different magnet materials were considered and
calculations were performed using Alnico V and a rare Earth magnet NdFe24.
From the study of magnetics, it is evident that the B/H ratio is the key to how a
basic magnet will perform in the circuit. The demagnetization/energy product
curves for the magnet materials considered in this concept are shown in
Figures 2.1-19 and 2.1-20.
When using a permanent magnet, consideration must be given to the
flux that never reaches the air gap. The cross-sectional area of the magnet
must be sufficiently sized to allow for flux losses. Flux lines will always follow
the path of least reluctance and some flux will "jump across" the length of the
magnet. This leakage flux must also be supplied by the magnet, and it requires
an increase in area by some leakage factor. In practice, these factors range
from 1.1 to 50. For this concept, the leakage factors were calculated and
accounted for in determining the magnet size. In magnet design, the leakage
fluxes can be reduced to two parts:
• The flux near the air gap that does not pass directly across the gap
but runs parallel to it. This is called the fringing flux.
• The flux that radiates between the legs or across the back of all
parts of the circuit. This is called the leakage flux.
The leakage factor can be based on permeance of the paths and can
be expressed as the ratio of the total permeance and the permeance of the gap.
A series of equations commonly used to estimate the permeances for various
space considerations were used to calculate the permeances of the circuit in
this concept.
In this study, it was felt that the mass and volume of the circuit would
be the drivers of the feasibility of the use of a permanent magnet. For the
magnetic circuit considered, the magnet length was varied and the resulting
circuit mass, circuit height, dmuit width, magnet thickness, and total permeance
were calculated. These variables were plotted versus magnet length for both
magnet materials considered for a flux of 2,000 gausses in the air gap. For
Alnico V, Figure 2.1-21 is a plot of circuit mass versus magnet, Figure 2.1-22 is
a plot of circuit length versus magnet length, Figure 2.1-23 is a plot of circuit
width versus magnet length, Figure 2.1-24 is a plot of magnet thickness versus
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magnet length, and Figure 2.1-25 is a plot of total permeance versus magnet
length. Each of these plots include curves for various gap lengths. These same
plots are presented for NdFe24 in Figures 2.1-26 through 2.1-30. From Figure
2.1-21, the circuit mass has a minimum value at a certain magnet length. This
happens because the total permeance is a function in part of the magnet area-
to-length ratio. Thus the minimum values for each gap length represent sort of
an optimum value. Comparing Figure 2.1-21 and Figure 2.1-26 shows that the
NdFe24 magnet has its optimum values at lower magnet lengths than the
Alnico V. This is consistent with the fact that NdFe24 has a greater maximum
energy product that the Alnico V, meaning it is generally a "stronger" magnetic
material. Thus, NdFe24 is the material of choice for minimizing mass and
volume. To accommodate a fumace module 50 cm in height, a gap length of at
least 50 cm is required. Figure 2.1-21 shows that, for a 50-cm gap length, the
circuit has its minimum mass of al_proximately 4,000 kg at a magnet length of
45 cm. Using Figure 2.1-22, for a magnet length of 45 cm, the circuit length is
approximately 260 cm, and from Figure 2.1-23, the circuit width is approximately
220 cm. The circuit width sets the inside diameter of the shield to be used.
From Figure 2.1-16 for a shield inside diameter of 220 cm the shield thickness
will be greater than 80 cm (by extrapolation), which will result in a shield mass
of perhaps 10,000 kg. Thus, to use a permanent magnet, the gap size in the
circuit considered must be very small to become feasible from a mass and
volume standpoint.
The resource requirements, shown in Table 2.1-20, for the concept
utilizing a permanent magnet were based on accommodating a furnace module
with an outside diameter of 20 cm and an overall length of 50 cm. The
requirements were estimated for a system with an emitted magnetic flux of 1.0
gauss as well as for 0.3 gauss.
Normal E]ectromaanet _¥stem Conceot
Concepts for using a normal electromagnet have been examined in
this study. The most viable concept is shown schematically in Figure 2.1-31.
The concept consists of a solenoid-type electromagnet with a clear bore to
accommodate the furnace module. The electromagnets are commonly
constructed of a copper wire coil wound around a cylindrical form made of a
nonmagnetic metal. The windings are insulated with an epoxy or lacquer. The
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TABLE 2.1-20. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Mass and Volume Requirements The overall mass of this concept will be in
excess of 10,000 kg. The system will be
approximately 450 cm high and 400 cm
wide.
Power Requirements None
Thermal Requirements None
Data Requirements The data requirements for this concept
are well within the scope of the SSFF
capabilities.
Venting Requirements None
Consumables None
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height of the magnet coil in this concept is sufficient to cover the melting zones
of the furnace module under consideration. The magnetic field is set up by
passing a current through the copper conductor. This magnet can operate at
room temperature so a refrigeration system is not needed. Heat is generated by
the coil, however, which will require an active cooling system to prevent
overheating of the conductor. The electromagnet has a water jacket through
which cooling water, is passed t0 maintain the magnet within its proper
temperature range. The magnetic field can be vaded by adjusting the current
flow through the copper coil. In addition to the magnet coil and the cooling
subsystem, a power supply is also required which will probably be included in
the SSFF Core. For this concept, resource requirements were estimated and
are discussed in Table 2.1-21 for various system sizes.
The resource requirements for the concept utilizing a solenoid-type
electromagnet were based on accommodating a furnace module w!th an
outside diameter of 20 cm and a hot zone length of 20 cm. It was assumed that
the overall height of the furnace module was 60 cm. The form used for the coil
winding was constructed of aluminum and was assumed to be 0.254 cm thick.
The magnet wir_ used in the coil winding was constructed of copper. The
requirements were estimated for a system with an emitted magnetic flux of
1.0 gauss as well as for 0.3 gauss.
2.1.7 Rack Structures
The SSFF has been allocated five double rack locations in the USL
module. The SSFF Core is the only component of this facility currently defined
as requiring the standard payload rack envelope. The SSFF Core is composed
of subsystems common to all of the Furnace Modules in the facility. The
individual Furnace Module mounting requirements are currently undefined.
The objective of this study is to identify and determine the relative
merits of mounting the Furnace Module in a standard rack as opposed to
developing a special rack-mounting structure peculiar to the Furnace Module
requirements.
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TABLE 2.1-21. MASS AND VOLUME REQUIREMENTS (Sheet 1 of 3)
Mass and Volume Requirements For a given magnet coil diameter and coil
height, it was found that for a desired
magnetic flux at the center of the solenoid
the mass of the coil will vary inversely
with the power delivered to the coil. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.1-32, which is a
plot of magnet coil mass versus power
input to the coil for a 2,000 gauss
magnetic flux at various coil inside
diameters. As can be seen from
Figure 2.1-32, there is a tradeoff between
the mass of the coil and the power
requirement. For a 20-cm diameter
furnace module, and a power
requirement of 1,000 W, the mass of the
coil is approximately 135 kg.
Figure 2.1-33 is a plot of the outer
diameter of the magnetic coil versus the
the power input for various coil inside
diameters. For a 1000-W power input
and an inside diameter of 20 cm, the
outside diameter of the coil is
approximately 44 cm. The outer diameter
of the coil is govemed by the number of
turns in the coil, the coil height and the
diameter of the wire used in the coil.
Thus, the overall outside diameter of the
coil is 44 cm, which means that the inside
diameter of the magnetic shield must be
at least 44 cm. Using Figure 2.1-14,
which is a plot of the emitted magnetic
flux versus the required thickness of the
magnetic shield, for a shield with an
inside diameter of 44 cm and constructed
of Alloy 1, the required thickness for an
emitted flux of 0.3 gauss is approximately
14.1 cm. For an emitted flux of 1.0 gauss,
the required shield thickness is
approximately 13.6 cm. There is not
much difference between the two values
since for both thicknesses, the flux in the
shield material will be above the
saturation value of 7,500 gausses. This
can be verified using Figure 2.1-17, which
shows that for a shield with an inside
diameter of 44 cm, the minimum shield
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TABLE 2.1-21. MASS AND VOLUME REQUIREMENTS (Sheet 2 of 3)
Mass and Volume Requirements
(Conc.)
thickness to avoid saturation of the
material is approximately 15 cm. Using
Figure 2.1-16, for a shield with an inside
diameter of 44 cm and a thickness of
14.1 ¢m, the shield mass is
approximately 1300 kg. Thus, the overall
outside diameter of the magnetic shield is
approximately 72.2 cm for an emitted
magnetic flux of 0.3 gauss and 71.2 cm
for an emitted flux of 1.0 gauss. Using
Figures 2.1-32 and 2.1-33, the power and
mass requirements for an electromagnet
to accommodate other furnace module
diameters can be determined as was
done in this case for a 20-cm diameter
furnace module.
Power Requirements In this study, it was assumed that 120 Vdc
power will be supplied to the
electromagnet. Figure 2.1-32 shows that
there is a tradeoff between the power
requirement for the electromagnet and
the mass of the electromagnet. A power
requirement of 1000 W was sele.cted
which should be viable since the furnace
module will also require a certain amount
of power which will depend on its design.
Using Figure 2.1-32 however, the mass
requirement for this concept can be
determined for other power levels if
desired.
Thermal Requirements As mentioned above, the electromagnet
will require active cooling. This is
because of the joule heating of the
magnet wire. The rate of heat removal
must be at the same rate that it is
produced to prevent the temperature from
increasing. Assuming a temperature
difference of 25 °F between the inlet and
exit temperatures of the cooling water
flowing in the water jacket surrounding
the electromagnet, to provide 1,000 W of
cooling, approximately 62 kg/h of cooling
water is required.
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MASS AND VOLUME REQUIREMENTS (Sheet 3 of 3)
There are no stringent data requirements
envisioned for this concept except in the
area of ensuring that the magnetic flux
emitted from the system does not exceed
the specified limit of 0.3 gauss. If there
are fluctuations in the current delivered to
the electromagnet, the magnetic flux
produced will also fluctuate and
emissions could exceed the limiting
value. For this reason, the current must
be monitored and provisions put in place
to control the effects of current surges
which may impact the data requirements
of this concept.
None
None
2-77
°
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
100
\ [
!
Magnet Inside Diameter
.| ._
I
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Power, watts
FIGURE 2.1-32. PLOT OF MAGNET MASS VS POWER
2-78
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
10 nl
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5001
Power, watts
FIGURE 2.1-33. PLOT OF MAGNET OUTER DIAMETER VS POWER
2-79
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
FurTlaCe Mountina Reauirements
The current design concepts for the candidate Furnace Modules call
for the furnace containers to be base mounted using a mounting flange. Each
Furnace Module container mounting flange would conform to a standard bolt
circle. The Furnace Module EAC flange will mate with an attachment flange
integral with the rack attachment structure. The rack attachment structure may
be a standard payload rack incorporating the mounting plate or it may be a
special structure designed only to locate and support the Furnace Module. This
study will identify issues involved in this trade.
The advantages and disadvantages of using the standard rack are as
follows:
• Advantages.
- No new hardware development is required other than a
mounting adapter structure
Special problems associated with Furnace Module
transportation logistics are avoided. The Furnace Modules are
flown up to the station in the standard rack.
• Disadvantages
- An equipment rack design is not required for the Furnace
Module.
The Furnace Modules are designed to be base mounted; the
current rack configuration is more suited for front-mounted
equipment.
Because of the first two items above, the standard rack will
have to be modified with a base mounting platform to
accommodate the Furnace Modules. This modification makes
the standard rack a nonstandard item.
If furnace alignment with the residual g-vector is required, an
alignment gimbai must be attached to the rear wall of the rack
structure. This modification may require a nonstandard rack
structure.
The standard rack configuration allows very little clearance
between the top of the Furnace Module EAC and the rack
upper surface. On the CGF furnace, the overhead ctearance is
only 8 in., which is insufficient for removal or insertion of
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sample ampoules. The top of the EAC can only be accessed
by removal of the EAC from the rack or tilting the EAC out into
the lab module aisle. The base mounting attachment may
therefore have to include a pivot point to allow tilting the
Furnace Module for ampoule insertion and removal.
The advantages and disadvantages of the nonstandard rack
mounting structure are as follows:
• Advantages
- The structure can be optimized for the purpose of supporting
the Fumace Module.
- No upper rack structure is required if the load reactions can be
properly distributed among the lower attachment points:
Elimination of the rack structure allows ready access to the lab
module wall in the event of a hull breach.
- A furnace orientation system is more easily accommodated.
- Elimination of the rack structure improves access to the
Furnace Module EAC.
- The standard rack cost may be eliminated.
- Total furnace launch mass can be optimized by eliminating
unused components in the rack structure.
• Disadvantages
- The nonstandard structure development and qualification may
be cost prohibitive.
The nonstandard support structure may not "prove adequate as
a launch container for the Furnace Modules requiring a
separate logistics carder.
The nonstandard structure may be driven towards a standard
rack-type structure to properly distribute the load reactions
between the upper and lower attachment points on the lab
module wall.
g_o.cc,Lu.sL l
No conclusion can be reached at this time because of the immaturity
of the rack design and the Furnace Module configurations.
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2.1.8 Thermal Control Subsystem
The objective of the SSFF Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS) is to
provide the thermal heat sink for the Furnace Modules included in the facility as
well as heat loads of the coidplate-mounted electronics in the core rack. This
subsystem is composed of a water loop, which performs the following functions.
• CoUection of heat dissipated by the Furnace Modules
• Collection of heat dissipated by the electronics in the core rack
• Heat transport
• Rejection of heat to the SSF Lab Customer Thermal Control
System.
The SSFF TCS will use WP-01 components where possible to ensure
cost effectiveness and efficiency. A schematic of the TCS in a Space Station
rack is shown in Figure 2.1-34, which shows the major components of the
subsystem. It is expected that the components of the subsystem will reside in
the the rear of the rack behind the ¢oldplate-mounted SSFF Core Electronics. A
schematic of the water loop is shown in Figure 2.1-35. This schematic shows
the configuration with a 24,000-W capacity. The water loop .collects heat from
the Furnace Modules and core rack electronics. The collected heat is then
transferred to the Space Station TCS via the heat exchangers.
The TCS will be evolutionary in that its capabilities will be scaled up
with the growth of the SSFF. The initial configuration of the subsystem will
have an 8,000-W capacity. As shown in Figure 2.1-35, this initial configuration
will have only one of the branches containing the pumps and heat exchangers.
When growth beyond 8,000 W is needed, the second pump and heat
exchanger branch is added and later the third branch is added to get the
24,000-W capacity.
The subsystem incorporates parallel rack flow to allow independent
service to the Furnace Modules and the Core electronics. Each Furnace
Module can be isolated from the system. The Core rack coldplates are
connected in sedes as shown in" Figure 2.1-36.
Flow control in the loop is maintained by the two flow controllers
which regulate the flows in the particular branches. These flow controllers will
consist of an arrangement of solenoid operated trim and check valves to control
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FIGURE 2.1-34. SCHEMATIC OF THERMAL CONTROL
SUBSYSTEM IN RACK
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FIGURE 2.1-35. SCHEMATIC OF THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
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the flow. The flow controllers will be equipped with sensors to monitor flow
rates, temperatures, and pressures at various points.
The heat exchangers used are expected to be the 8000-W heat
exchangers used in the WP-01 TCS design. These heat exchangers operate at
a design flow rate of 1,100 Ib/h with an effectiveness of 0.92 and a design
pressure drop of 0.5 psi. The heat exchangers are 18 in. long, 8 in. high, and
4 in. wide.
The ¢oidplates used in the core rack have not been selected, but the
¢oldplates from WP-01 are being considered. These coidplates have three
sizes but all have a design pressure drop of 0.6 psi and a design conductance
of 1.62 W/in2pF.
The pump packages circulate the water through the loop, and each
consists of an inlet filter, an electrically powered centrifugal pump, and a
reverse flow check valve. Sensors are included to monitor fluid inlet and outlet
temperatures and pressure dse across the package. An accumulator is
included with each pump to compensate for thermal expansion within the water
loop and maintains positive water pump inlet pressure. A sensor monitors the
accumulator water quantity.
Hand-operated valves are included throughout the loop to provide
manual control if necessary. Performance data for the TCS are given in
Table 2.1-22.
The resource requirements of the TCS were estimated and
summarized in Table 2.1-23.
2.1.9 Fluids Distribution System
The SSFF is modular facility consisting of five double racks for SSF.
This facility will be designed for crystal growth and solidification research in the
fields of electronic and photonic materials, metals and alloys, and glasses and
ceramics. Several furnaces are being studied for incorporation in the SSFF
concept. This is a preliminary conceptual design of the SSFF Fluids
Distribution System (FDS). A conceptual design of this system can be seen in
Figure 2.1-37.
The variety of furnaces to be used in the SSFF require many different
resources to properly execute their objectives as shown in the block diagram in
Figure 2.1-38. They will all require very sophisticated control methods to
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TABLE 2.1-22. PERFORMANCE DATA FOR THERMAL CONTROL
SUBSYSTEM
Maximum Heat Rejection Capability
Water Loop Row Rate
8 kW (24 kW Growth)
TBD
Water Temperature Range:
Minimum
Maximum
75 =F
100 =F
Power Consumption 60 W
Heat Dissipation 60 W (nominal)
Maximum Operating Pressure
Fluid Leakage
200 psi
TBD
Total Pressure Drop 20 psi
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TABLE 2.1-23.
Physical Properties
• Mass
- Heat Exchangers
- Coldplates
- Plumbing
- Pump Packages
Total
Power
Thermal Requirements
Consumables
• Data
- Number Of Channels
Average Samples/sec
Peak Samples/sec
- Average Data Rate
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
The volume and mass properties of the
equipment in the TCS were estimated from
equipment used in similar systems and the
common equipment in WP-01.
35.40 kg
34.86 kg
100.00 kg
284.40 kg
454.66 kg
The only component of the TCS requiring
power is the pump package. It is estimated
that its power requirement will be 60 W.
The heat dissipated by the pump package is
expected to have a nominal value of 60 W.
This heat load is expected to be removed by
avionics air.
TBD
85
1
20
2 kb/sec
Data Requirements The instrumentation and data requirements
of the TCS are presented in Table 2.1-24.
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TABLE 2.1-24. DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR THERMAL
CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION
Temperature Sensors
Pressure Sensors
Delta Pressure Sensors
Quantity Sensors
Solenoid Valves
Rowrate Sensors
QTY
24
24
3
3
10
10
SAMPLING RATE
Hz
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FIGURE 2.1-37. FLUIDS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
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FIGURE 2.1-38. SSFF FLUID SERVICE BLOCK DIAGRAM
2-91
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
ensure that experimental parameters are monitored and adjusted according to
their individual needs. Some furnaces may require a facility to accurately align
them in the direction of the Earth's residual gravity. In addition to these and
other systems, the furnaces will require a system to provide them with an
adequate supply of gases and liquids for processing, along with a vacuum and
waste gas removal system. Most of the furnaces studied thus far have used
argon as an inert gas for processing. In the future, some furnaces may require
other gases such as oxygen or hydrogen.
Currently, the SSF Process Materials Management System (PMMS)
will be providing only nitrogen and a vacuum level of 10 -3 tort to the user
community. Therefore, the SSFF FDS will be responsible for supplying all other
gases required for processing of samples along with maintaining proper
vacuum level, and management of waste fluids. The Science Capabilities
Requirements Document (SCRD) calls for a vacuum level of 10 "5 tort for the
Furnace Modules. This report will discuss the methods available to meet the
experimental requirements, and the factors in the design which could cause
problems with the experiment or Space Station environment.
The FDS will interface with the Space Station PMMS at the nitrogen
supply line, the Waste Gas Management System (WGMS), the Vacuum/Vent
System, and the Ultrapure Water System (UPWS). There are two separate
systems within the FDS. One system is responsible for supplying/removing
gases, and one is responsible for supplying/removing liquids.
The FDS will supply processing gases and water to the Furnace
Modules in the SSFF. It.will use the supply of nitrogen from SSF PMMS in
addition to user-supplied gases. Currently, SSF will supply N2 to each rack at
90 psia, and SSFF user-supplied gases will be bottled at 1,000 to 1,500 psig
(600 psig max for CO2) and regulated down to 90 psia. The following is a
description of the path followed by the gases through the system. A schematic
of this system is shown in Figure 2.1-39.
First, the user must identify which gas will be required for processing
of samples and the supply pressure needed. If N2 is used, it will flow to the first
solenoid valve at 90 psia. The valve is then opened and the N2 flows to a
25-psia regulator, and from this regulator it will flow to a 20-3 psia variable
(mechanical or electronic) regulator. The gas pressure can be adjusted at this
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point down to 3 psia. The.N2 will then enter the experiment chamber. Pressure
sensors will monitor the N2 at locations downstream of regulators, and check
valves will be used to ensure that no backflow into the system occurs. The N2
enters the experiment chamber by passing through a solenoid valve and then
through quick-disconnects (QDs) which attach the experiment chamber to the
system.
The N2 will then exit the'experiment chamber through another QD,
and after the gas has sewed its purpose, a gate valve will be opened to allow
the gas to exit the chamber. When the waste gas exits the chamber, it will have
three possible paths. The choice of path will depend on the user requirements
or the ability of SSF to accept the gas.
The SCRD requires that a vacuum level of. 10 -5 torr must be
obtainable in the SSFF. This vacuum level will require the use of a
turbomolecular pump. The SSF can supply this vacuum level, but the level will
fluctuate over time and hazardous materials cannot be vented. If the waste gas
which exits the experiment chamber is sufficiently clean to enter directly into the
WGMS, two gate valves may be opened and the gases will enter directly into
the WGMS at a vacuum level of 10 -3 ton'. If the gases are not sufficiently clean,
it can be directed through a filter which will scrub it to the desired cleanliness
and then it will flow to the WGMS. However, SSFF must verify that all gases to
be vented are nonhazardous at analytical integration. The ability to verify this
could be a major design driver for the system. If SSFF cannot vent to SSF
vacuum vent, a level of containment will be lost. If SSFF must vent hazardous
materials, a waste storage bottle will be used to store the material. A
compressor must be employed to pump the gases into the bottle, and
compressors will cause a large number of low-frequency vibrations which
would seriously threaten the ability to perform an ideal crystal growth
experiment and would also sedously effect other experiments in the USL which
rely on the Iow-g environment.
The FDS liquid delivery/removal system is responsible for handling
water used by the furnace for processing. A schematic of this system is shown
in Figure 2.1-40. It is not a replacement for the SSFF TCS. Some furnaces,
such as the MASA, use a water quench system for rapid solidification. This
O
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FIGURE 2.1-40. FLUIDS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
LIQU ID DELIVERY/REMOVAL
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system will be designed to accommodate these and other furnaces with a need
for water.
The FDS liquid delivery/removal system delivers water from the SSF
UPWS to a specially designed accumulator. The accumulator uses a bellows
device to contain the water until it is needed in the furnace. After the UPWS
supplies enough water to fill the bellows (2300 co for MASA), a directional valve
directs the water supply back into the UPWS. When the water is needed for a
quench, pressure from a gas contained between the bellows and the
accumulator wails will force the water from the accumulator through a regulator
at a given pressure. The water will enter the quench block of the furnace and
will then exit the experiment module. Since steam will likely be present, a
desiccant cartridge will be used to remove moisture from the gas before it goes
on to the WGMS. The water will then circulate around a closed-loop system
through a heat exchanger which interfaces the SSFF TCS. A pump will be
used to maintain flow through the system, and this may cause unwanted
vibrations. A second accumulator will interface this line so that waste fluids can
be removed from the system.
Table 2.1-25 lists the physical components of the FDS, while
Table 2.1-26 gives the resource requirements;
2.1.10 Control and Data Manaaement System
The Control and Data Management System (CDMS) is central to the
SSFF concept and will provide data collection, conversion, storage,
transmission, and display, as well as providing power conditioning, conversion,
distribution, and open- and closed-loop control. The SSFF CDMS is currently
planned to use Space Station Data Management System (SSDMS)
components as building blocks where practical. This report is a summary of
work performed to define the CDMS conceptual design and the required
subsystems.
Past high temperature crystal growth and directional solidification
experiments relied on experiment-unique avionics packages. This requires that
large funding provisions be made available for each new experiment simply to
support avionics design, fabrication, and spares logistics. Obviously, this
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Pressure 15
Temperature Sensors 7
Other Sensors 9
Valves 23
Pumps 4
Quick Disconnects 6
Accumulators 3
Desiccant Cartridge 1
Filters 1
Bottle Storage 4
TABLE 2.1-26. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Power 1-2 kW
Weight 289 Ib
Volume 1.5 m3
Processing Gases Argon
Oxygen
Hydrogen
Helium
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approach reduces the funding available for new and innovative materials
processing furnaces, as well as ensuring greater schedule risk.
The objective of this CDMS study is to develop a concept for a Space
Station USL avionics package that will mitigate the necessity for constant and
costly unique fumaca avionics design, and to do so in a manner consistent with
and compatible to the SSDMS. The benefit dedved from this concept will be
greater funding availability for new furnace designs and will result in more
advanced matedals research opportunities for an equivalent financial
investment.
The SSFF CDMS envisioned in this study will incorporate distributed
processing ensuring that each experiment will have adequate processing
capability for current and forecasted materials processing furnaces.
Q
The SSFF CDMS will provide all data acquisition, control algorithm
execution, control power conversion, and will provide for crew and SSDMS
interfaces.
The SSFF CDMS concept incorporates distributed processing.
Distributed pro(_essing adds fault tolerance, evolutionary growth ease and
convenience, and spares logistics simplification. The use of SSDMS
components is also a driver towards distributed processing in that the SSDMS
component designs are biased toward a distributed system architecture
(indicative of the entire SSDMS architecture). The use of SSDMS components
will simplify the SSFF CDMS hardware design effort and allow the on-orbit
SSFF to use common SSDMS hardware spares.
The CDMS distributed processing concept allocates one
microprocessor to each furnace. This concept will ensure that the necessary
control algorithms can be implemented and executed at a sampling rate
sufficient for all current and anticipated needs. The distributed processing
concept also allows for a furnace requiring even greater data processing
capability. Should this occur, the CDMS distributed processing concept will
allow for the addition of microprocessors to the system, as required, for furnace
control.
The CDMS will also incorporate a three-channel 1553B local area
network (I.AN) to provide a data path for power control, crew interface, and
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downlink. The distributed processing concept is best executed on a system
using a LAN. The I_AN will allow convenient system expansion with minimum
hardware impact. This attribute becomes desirable during initial buildup to full
configuration and during future capabilities enhancements. The use of a LAN is
also necessary to ensure that sufficient data path bandwidth is constantly
available for closed-loop control of the furnace and prime mover power. The
use of a LAN in the SSFF CDMS does not increase the amount of hardware
required to implement the CDMS and prevents unnecessary resource loading
of the" SSDMS fiber optic 100-Mbps bus.
The CDMS will contain centrally located power conditioning
equipment. The central location of Power conditioning equipment addresses
four issues. First, locating power conditioning equipment in the same rack as
the materials processing furnace places an unnecessary restriction on the
furnace mass and volume. Second, locating the power conditioning in the core
rack opens the opportunity to time share the power conditioning equipment
among all SSFF furnaces. By time multiplexing (load scheduling), SSFF can
supply required peak furnace power with less mass and volume. Third, the
thermal heat removal system can be made less complex by consolidation of the
power conditioning equipment. Fourth, the power conditioning equipment is a
strong source of electromagnetic interference (EMI). The furnace sensor data
could be corrupted by EMI. Remote location of the power conditioning
equipment will reduce this interference. Additionally, consolidation of the power
conditioning equipment will reduce the number of required EMI filters, saving
the associated mass and volume as well as simplifying EMI shielding design for
suppression of radiated EMI.'
The SSFF CDMS will be composed of the following components:
• One SSDMS Standard Data Processor
• Five SSDMS Command Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (CMDMs)
• One SSDMS Multipurpose Applications Console Fixed
(MPAC-F)
• Two Power Conditioning and Distribution Systems (PCDSs)
• One Status and Control Panel (SCP)
• Signal and power cabling within the SSFF rack assemblies.
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includes:
Additional equipment interfacing with and/or supporting the CDMS
• Five Environmental Control Systems (ECSs)
• Four nonsimilar unique avionics packages (supplied by the
furnace manufacturer) which contain those electrical functions that
are not practical to incorporate into the CDMS.
• Up to four matedals processing fumaces
• The SSDMS fiber-optic communications bus
• Space Station 120 Vdc power distribution bus
• Space Station thermal heat rejection system
• The mechanical support structure.
A block diagram of the SSFF CDMS is shown in Figure 2.1-41.
typiceJ SSFF CDMS hardware layout is shown in Figure 2.1-42.
Descriptions of the SSFF CDMS components are found
following paragraphs.
Standard Data Processor _SDP_
A
in the
This component is SSDMS equipment which will perform master
control of the SSFF system. The SDP will act as a single point of contact with
the SSDMS FDDI fiber-optic bus and will control data source, rates, and format
for injection into the FDDI bus and subsequent downlink. The SDP will perform
1553B bus arbitration and control data flow within the SSFF. The SDP will also
monitor individual CMDM and fumace performance and initiate fault alarms to
the crew and ground monitoring stations.
Command Multiolexer-Demultiolexer (CMDM_
This component is SSDMS equipment consisting of an embedded
data processor, expansion slots for I/O cards, a rack-mountable box, a power
supply, and a menu of standard I/O cards. This component will interface directly
with the materials processing fumace. The CMDM will execute all algorithms
necessary to perform open- and closed-loop control of the furnace. A separate
CMDM is located in the central rack to interface with and control the PCDS. The
CMDM will have input/output for analog, digital, solenoid, and serial
2-100
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
TBS
FIGURE 2.1-41. SSFF CDMS BLOCK DIAGRAM
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FIGURE 2.1-42. SSFF CDMS HARDWARE LAYOUT
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communication signals. Special purpose I/O cards will be designed for those
electrical functions determined to be desirable in the SSFF CDMS and not
supported by the SSDMS standard CMDM I/O card set.
Multioumose Aoolications Console - Fixed (MPAC-F_
This component is SSDMS equipment which serves as the crew
interlace. The MPAC-F will support manual command and data entry and
display of system status_ and will generate detailed data displays to enhance
SSFF operation and user friendliness. Mass data storage in fixed and
removable media will also be available. Audio annunciation of emergency and
anomaly conditions will be incorporated, as well as automatic callup of system
diagrams for the affected function. The MPAC-F will interface with and
c_mmunicate to the other SSFF components via a 1553B local bus.
SSFF Power Conditionino and Distribution System (PCDS)
This component is SSFF equipment and will transform the standard
120-Vdc Space Station power into the voltage and current levels required to
support furnace operation. This SSFF component is not part of the current
SSDMS. Included in this system will be a standard 120-Vdc to 28-Vdc
conversion supply to support the unique avionics, furnace sensors, and furnace
solenoid valves.
The PGDS will provide 120 Vdc to variable output level amplifiers to
be used in heater power and prime mover control. The individual elements of
the PCDS used for heater power control will consist of smart amplifiers using
microcontroilers (special-purpose microprocessors designed for stand-alone
operation) for mode and output level control. The use of microcontrollers in the
PCDS power amplifier allows modes of operation not possible with
conventional amplifiers. These capabilities include current output; voltage
output; power output; waveform generation including bumpless ramping, status,
and anomaly reporting; and performance monitoring. When used in the
vadable output current or power mode (user-selected modes), the amplifier
outputs can be parallelled, increasing current drive to provide the large currents
that are typically required for furnace heater low-impedance windings. This
mode of operation allows SSFF to support a much larger variation in the
furnace heater winding impedance while simultaneously maintaining a high
power conversion efficiency. The P.CDS will provide an output power switching
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matrix to facilitate software reconfiguration of the furnace heater amplifiers for
output parallelling and for fault tolerance spares insertion.
,_tatus and Control Panel (SCP/
This SSFF component consists of an interface panel giving CDMS
operating status, providing an accessible main power shutoff for emergency
and anomaly conditions, and for visual and audio annunciation of fault
¢onditionings. The $CP will be partially controlled by the crew rack CMDM to
facilitate software reconfiguration of the status signals and for monitoring crew
operation.
The CDMS resource requirements are shown in Table 2.1-27.
The paragraphs below describe the SSFF CDMS technology and
•schedule dsks.
_0ace StationDMS Comoonent DefinitionMatudtv level
The DMS component definitionsare immature and have a direct
impact on the proposed SSFF CDMS configuration. SSDMS. hardware
specificationsare currentlychanging or have recentlychanged. Specifications
ofcurrentconcern are:
• Software Development Workstations
Software Development flexibility
- Hardware availabilitydate
• SDP
- Power requirements
- Chassis form factor
- Data transmission rate
- Kernel software development and flexibility
- Hardware availability date
- Thermal cooling requirements
• CMDM
- Power requirements
- Number of I/0 cards that can be accommodated
- Chassis form factor
- I/0 sample rate limitations
- Kernel software development and flexibility
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TABLE 2.1-27. SSFF CDMS. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Power
Thermal Cooling
Consumables
Data
Video
Processing Times
120 Vclc and a maximum of 37 kW at
assembly completion
Up to 37 kW + TBD kW at assembly
completion. Cooling by a combination of
avionics air and avionics 20 °C water.
Argon - TBD. Depends on particular
materials processing experiments.
FDDI - 0.18Mbps. Data rate is variable and
dependent on experiment data quantity.
TBD
Variable -TBD. Depends on particular
materials processing experiments.
2-105
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
- Hardware availability date
- I/O card function, accuracy, and number of channels
- Thermal cooling requirements
• MPAC-F
- Power requirements
- Amount and type of mass storage
-. Chassis form factor
- Kernel software development and flexibility
- Hardware availability date
- Thermal cooling requirements.
The delivery dates for SSDMS hardware will have a direct impact on
the delivery date of SSFF. Substantial SSDMS schedule slip could jeopardize
the SSFF delivery date and the subsequent delivery of the USL.
The above hardware/software specifications are critical to the
performance of SSFF. These specification s may shift enough based on current
or future Space Station rescoping efforts to render the proposed SSFF system
topology unworkable using DMS components. The SSFF program would then
incur a substantial schedule risk and cost penalty to adapt the resulting DMS
components, to design avionics to replace the lost capability, or to embark on a
totally separate custom hardware development effort. The schedule risk and
cost impact increases as the program matures.
SSFF Reauirements and USL Double Rack Caoabilities
The SSFF furnace power requirements, the weight and volume of the
power conditioning and distribution avionics, could exceed the capabilities of
the USL double rack. Specifications of current concern are:
• Core Rack Allocation for the PCDS
- Avionics power conditioning at 2 W/in 3
- Avionics power conditioning at 2 W/oz
- One double rack weight allowance = 700 kg
(assume 45% of 700 kg available for PCDS)
- Power = (700 kg)x(45%)x(2 W/oz)x(35.24 oz/kg) = 22.2 kW
- Volume = (22.2 kW)/(2 W/in3)x(1 ft3/1728 in3) = 6.42 ft3
(This does not satisfy the 37 kW requirement for worst-case
operation.)
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• Furnace vs. Avionics (CDMS and unique avionics) competition for
rack volume and mass allocation
• ECS volume and mass are driven by furnace requirements.
The weight and volume of one SDP, one MPAC-F, one CMDM, and
the Core ECS are not known with precision. Therefore, the actual percentage
of the Core rack resources available for power conditioning can only be
estimated. The 45 percent weight PCDS factor allows for support structure,
cabling, heat rejection equipment, and other avionics packages. SSDMS
component volume and mass specification and SSFF rack capabilities will
become drivers for furnace design.
Crew Interface Timeline Reauirements
The amount of crew time required to operate the SSFF has not yet
been defined. Specific guidelines need to be developed for the hardware/
software/manual control breakpoints study.
Intearation and Ooerationa/C0_t Iml_acts
\
There is no satisfactory historical example of taking program-
approved hardware qualified by JSC and incorporating it into experiment
hardware to be qualified by MSFC. Current concerns are:
• Differences in factor of safety
° Differences in verification requirements
° Waiver approval cycle.
2.1.11 Modular Software
The Modular Software concept is key to the concept of providing a
cost-effective and flexible SSFF. Candidates for software modules include but
are not limited to: Heater Controls, Translation Mechanisms, Video and
Graphics processing, Signal Processing, Command and Control, and Uplink
and Downlink. The SSFF Modular Software is currently planned to use
SSDMS hardware and software components as building blocks where
-practical, This report i_ a summary of work performed to define the Modular
Software conceptual design and the required development and embedded
resources.
Past high temperature crystal growth and directional solidification
experiments relied on experiment-unique avionics packages and,'therefore,
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unique software to support this hardware. This led to unnecessary expense
where functionally equivalent but incompatible software packages have been
created for each new system. Standardizing the computer hardware for all
experiments served by the SSFF eliminates the need for experiment-unique
software unless an experiment has a unique functional or science requirement.
The objective of this study is to identify software functions that are
sufficiently general to serve a range of experiments, reducing software life-cycle
costs per experiment. Further, as software modules or packages are
developed, tested, and shared by what would have previously been separate
programs, reliability should increase significantly. This approach should reduce
the funding required for new and innovative materials processing furnaces, as
well as ensure greatly reduced schedule risk.
The SSFF Modular Software envisioned in this study will incorporate
software engineering practices consistent with ensuring that each experiment
will have adequate processing capability for current and forecasted materials
processing fumaces. Further, all software will be designed to permit future
modification and cost-effectiVe maintenance over the software and system life
cycle.
The SSFF software will provide for heater controls; translation
mechanisms; video/graphics; signal acquisition and processing; command and
control; and upUnk/downUnk of data, timelines, commands, and programs.
The SSFF Modular Software concept incorporates the use of SSDMS
processors, LANs, and software. Specifically, the following SSDMS Computer
Software Configuration Items (CSCIs) will provide the basis for further software
development: Ada Runtime Environment (RTE)/Operating System (OS),
Network Operating SYStem (NOS), Standard Services (STSV), Data Storage
and Retrieval (DSAR), User Support Environment (USE), System Manager
(SM), and Master Object Data Base (MODB). One more software CSCI the
Operations Management Application (OMA) places requirements upon is all
elements of the distributed DMS. Payloads are required to supply operational
parameters to the Operations Management System (OMS) through runtime
objects defined in the MODB. Detailed descriptions of the CSCIs are given in
Table 2.1-28.
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TABLE 2.1-28. SSFF SO_ARE CSCI DESCRIPTIONS
(Sheet 1 of 3)
v
Aria Run Time Environment
(RTE)lOperating System (OS)
Network Operating System
(NOS)
Standard Services (STSV)
Data Storage and Retrieval
(OSAR)
User Support Environment(USE)
System Manager (SM)
Master Object Data Base
(MODB)
Heater Controls
Responsible for the ADA tasking system and
interface to the processor environment,
including real-time clock.
Provides for communication between
processors and processes in the DMS
distributed architecture.
Implements the management of the Runtime
Object Data Base (ROD8). Runtime objects
are used to track all data and controls in the
distributed DMS architecture.
Essentially performs the function of the file
manager of Disk Operating Systems. It
provides for the creation, deletion, and
modification of files, and maintains security of
the file system.
Provides for the. human interaction with the
DMS system through the keyboard and
screen of the MPAC. USE further defines
prescribed methods for the display of data
and entering of commands and data.
Monitors andcontrois the software resources
within a processing node.
Provides for the definition of the RODB. This
CSCI is a ground-based function, but it
defines all movement of data and commands
(objects) onboard the SSF.
Responsible for the implementation of control
algorithms such as Proportional Differential
Integral (PID) controls of single
effector/sensor pairs, and more complex
algorithms using modern control theory
which takes into account the Plant
(uncoupled responses of the system) and
relates these uncoupled responses in a
system of equations to produce an
appropriate control output.
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TABLE 2.1-28. SSFF SOFTWARE CSCI DESCRIPTIONS
(Sheet 2 of 3)
Translation Mechanisms
Video/Graphics
Signal Acquisition and
Processing
A variety of Translation mechanisms are
used in Furnace Modules. For example the
Bridgman-Stockbarger furnaces use linear
translation to move either the furnace or
sample in relation to the other. The science
requirement for mcirogravity places
restriction on translation mechanisms for the
amount of vibration which they can impart to
a sample in processing. This can be limited
through the use of microstepping stepper
motors to produce sufficiently smooth
motions. Rotational translation has also
bee.n identified. Along with the requirements
for motion come the requirements to monitor
that motion. Both absolute and relative
motion must be monitored. Various methods
such as linear and rotary potentiometers,
shaft (optical) encoders, and linear (optical)
encoders may be used.
The Science requirements have identified
the need to produce and interact with
imaging. Visible, Infrared, and x-ray imaging
are requirements. To the DMS system, the
image capture is not essential. It is assumed
that all images will be converted to pixel-
based arrays for manipulation by the
Video/Graphics software. Pixel subtraction,
edge enhancements, and other techniques
may be employed to improve image quality.
Pattern recognition may be used in the
monitoring of crystal growth, with possible
feedback into control algorithms.
Signals in the form of accelerometer data
may be monitored to characterize the
ambient environment in which crystal growth
occurs. Because of the vast amount of data
that can be accumulated from
accelerometers alone, there is a need to
filter, transform, and recognize significant
events as opposed to random background
noise.
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TABLE 2.1-28. SSFF SOFTWARE CSCI DESCRIPTIONS
(Sheet 3 of 3)
Command and Control
Uplink/Downlink of Data,
"nmelines, Commands, and
Programs
Commands to the SSFF may originate
onboard (MPAC keyboard), or from ground-
based Principal Investigators at the Payload
Operations and Integration Centers (POICs).
The possibility of two commands arriving
simultaneously requires that there be an
arbitration discipline enforced in software.
Also, because of the nature of the control
algorithms and the nature of the processes
under control, commands must limit checked
and checked for appropriateness based
upon a knowledge of the timeline and history
of a particular experiment.
At various times, data to the ground (POIC)
will change subject to a change in
processing. Changes to timelines,
operational data (gains in controls), and
changes in software shall be accommodated
through uplink from the ground. End-to-end
vedtication of data transmission is essential
to system integrity.
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Where practical, SSFF software shall be coded in Ada as are most
SSF DMS CSCIs. However, the SSFF CDMS system will be based in part
upon the use of microcontrollers, as in the power conditioning system. Further,
various signal processing and video processing functions are best performed
by specific processing architectures for which no Ada compilers or RTEs exist or
the existing one are not appropriate.
Table 2.1-29 lists the SSFF embedded resource requirements.
2.1.12 Video Imaoina Subsystem
Based upon the video/imaging requirements for the Visibly
Transparent Furnace, VCG Furnace, HWFZ Furnace, and the Interface
Radiographic Measurement System, and the limited capability of the SS WP-02
DMS, it will be necessary to develop a dedicated subsystem for the acquisition,
processing, compression, storage, and transmission of video imaging data.
This report covers the conceptual design of the Video Imaging Subsystem
pedormed under the SSFF Conceptual Design Study.
The requirements identified in the SCRD specify 1028 x 1028 pixels
of resolution at 12 bits per pixel and between 20 and 30 frames/sec. The SCRD
also specifies capability for onboard viewing with frame rate conversions and
frame grabbing capability to support image enhancement. Currently, WP-02
plans to provide the capability for image processing, including image
enhancement techniques through the C&T network, which can be viewed over
the monitors at the MPAC. The C&T will be limited to NTSC signals only, and,
based on the access limits to the FDDI, may actually have to be compressed
below NTSC resolutions. WP-02 DMS system is providing a Mass Storage Unit
capable of 250 Mbytes of storage which is good for about 8 sec of data at the
peak generation rate.
The Video Imaging Subsystem will be composed of the components
listed in Table 2.1-30, and a block diagram of these components is given in
Figure 2.1-43. The monitor, processor, control unit, and data storage unit will be
located in the Core facility rack. These components will interface to standard or
user-unique light sources and cameras in the Furnace Module. They will also
interface to unique cameras and imagers which provide the TBD signal format.
The control unit will provide the signal conditioning and formatting necessary to
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TABLE 2.1-29. SSFF-EMBEDDED RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Processing
Data
Video
Processing Times
A combination of DMS SDP, MSU,
CMDM, and MPAC processors as well
as other TBD processing elements.
FDDI - TBD Mbps. Data rate is variable
and dependent on experiment data
quantity.
TBD
Variable - TBD. Depends on particular
materials processing experiments.
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TABLE 2.1-30. VIDEO IMAGING SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
COMPONENT
Dedicated Video
Processor
High-Resolution Monitor
and Keyboard
Camera Control Unit
Mass Storage Unit
Imaging Detector Device
Light Source
NUMBER
1-3
3
3
3
3
NOTES
80386 processor on an open bus for
user-developed cards to perform
image processing
Display and keyboard for onboard
viewing. Current MPAC could be
used if high-resolution monitors/high-
resolution graphics cards are added
to the WP-02 design
The signal conditioner and shutter
control for the camera head
MIL-STD-2179
Integrated into the Furnace Module
Integrated into the Furnace Module
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interface to the dedicated video processor. A unique imager or camera may
require a unique control unit. Each interface of the control unit shall be
specified to ensure the maximum flexibility to the user community.
The dedicated video processor should be a bus with public
specifications driven by at least a 80386 processor with capability for unique
image processing boards to be inserted. The 80386 is marginal for many
image processing techniques but is planned as the primary processor for
SSDMS equipment. This design will be similar to off-the-shelf boards and PCs
for ground-based video systems. The development of an open-bus system is
essential to ensure the ability to incorporate advanced capabilities expected to
be common practice during the timeframe in which this system is flying aboard
the SSF. This is a tricky issue, since many times an open standard based on
convectively cooled (forced air) gr0und-based buses is modified to allow
cooling through the sides to a coldplate. The SDP provided by WP-02 could
serve as this processor if the modifications to the bus architecture were
published and an interface card to the HDRL were provided. The SDP would
require modification to incorporate the boards for image processing and the
drivers for a high-resolution monitor. The current MPAC could be modified for
use in the Video Imaging Subsystem at a lower development cost, if the bus
architecture were cleady specified and public. Low-cost breadboards based on
the IBM PS2 with a Multibus II augmentation and off-the-shelf Image Processing
Boards could easily be developed for the MPAC design, but the modifications to
the Multibus il backplane are not public. The MPAC could provide the
processing and monitoring capability. Either route would require the
development of a high-resolution video monitor to allow onboard viewing of the
high-resolution images. There may be difficulty developing a high-resolution
monitor that can be flight qualified. The dedicated processor will support the
network interface to the HDRL provided by WP-02. Currently, there is no
specification on this interface and no interface card identified in the PDR
documentation.
The Mass Storage Unit will be required to store video data, since the
WP-02 DMS will only provide one MSU with TBD Mbytes of storage. Currently,
this unit is proposed as the ZOE recorder for all payloads and subsystems in the
SSF USL_ The Mass Storage Unit planned for the Vide'o Imaging Subsystem
will be a MIL-STD-2179 recorder with up to 1 Gbyte of storage and 250 Mbps
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data rate. This system is being developed for the ATMOS project and may be
flight qualified; however, the technology is still not proven.
The cameraJimagers will be commercially available CCDs up to
1024 x 1024 which actually have 1,028 lines but only 1,024 or 1,026 useful
lines depending on the mode of operation. With the current CCD technology,
high resolution is inversely proportional to the frames/see and there may be
difficulty in obtaining 30 frames/sac at 1024 x 1024, but current technology is
close. Lower resolutions will permit much higher frame rates if required. Each
camera provided by the SSFF as common equipment shall be compatible with
the standard control unit in the Core Facility. Other cameras may require
unique control units which are compatible to the standard interface of the
dedicated video processor. The imager device may also be a unique device for
the Interface Radiographic Measurement System requiring a unique control
unit. This device has resolution comparable to the aforementioned CCDs, but
the signal format has not been defined.
The Video Imaging Subsystem will require the resources defined in
Table 2:1-31 for operation. These values could be significantly larger to
incorporate user unique processing capabilities and imaging sources.
The Video Imaging Subsystem can be developed to meet the
requirements for onboard viewing and data storage; however, downlink will be
limited by access to the C&T system and the capability of TDRSS. Downlinking
for telesclence will not be under the control of the payload developer. Currently,
the interface to the C&T network is limited by 10 Mbps access from the FDDI
network and there is no interface for the DMS processors identified for use with
the HDRL through the patch panel. The fiber used in the HDRL is identical to
the fiber used in the FDDI LAN. While the advertised capability says that
1 Gbps is available, only 100 Mbps will be usable. The 1 Gbps is a theoretical
value for the optical fiber. This same fiber is limited to 100 Mbps for the FDDI
LAN.
Specific requirements for image processing and data compression
may require unique user-developed cards and associated software developed
by a payload developer for a specific mission or experiment. This system
should employ a modular hardware and software configuration with the Orbital
Replacement Unit being at the camera and board level.
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TABLE 2.1-31. VIDEO SYSTEM RESOURCES
Power
Total Weight
Volume
Data
Resolution
Bits per Pixei
Frames per Second
Max. Data Rate
250 W
125 Ib
.03 m3
1024 x 1024 pixels
8-12
1-30
252 Mbps @ 20 fps
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The development of a flight-qualified, high-resolution monitor has not
been done. There are many feasibility issues related to flight qualifying a high-
resolution monitor. Currently, the Depa_ment of Defense has several projects
to improve the technology based on processes which do not have as many
safety concerns.
2.1.13 United States Materials Laborztorv (USML_
USML provides the required resources to facilitate materials
processing experimentation within the Common Module environment. USML
consists of the following nine subsystems which are described briefly in the
following paragraphs. (See Figure 2.1-44.)
• Structure_Mechanisms
• Electrical Power (EPS)
• Data Management/Communications (DMS)
• Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS)
• Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS)
• Software (S/W)
• Vacuum Vent
• Process Materials Management (PMMS)
• Laboratory Characterization/Support Equipment (or simply
"Laboratory Support Equipment').
2.1.13.1 Structures Mechanisms The structures mechanisms
subsystem consists pdmarily of equipment racks and secondary structure
required to accommodate subsystem and experiment equipment, and the
necessary mechanisms to facilitate:
• Maintenance/replacement of rack-mounted equipment
• Access to module pressure shell
• On-orbit instaUation/removal of integrated racks.
2.1.13.2 ElectriCal Power Svstem (EPS_ - The EPS provides
electrical power to USML subsystems and experiments. The USML-unique
EPS hardware consists of Payload Power Control Units (PPCUs) and various
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USML
TBS
FIGURE 2.1-44. TBS
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cable assemblies. Redundant power is supplied as required to critical
hardware. The current EPS design concept is illustrated in Figure 2.1-45.
2.1.13.3 Data Manaaement anti CQrTlrnunications .System (DMS_-
The USML DMS provides:
* Control of USML experiments and subsystems
• Monitodng of USML experiments and subsystems
• Interface with the SSDMS
• Caution and Warning System interface for MTL experiments and
subsystems
• Experiment and subsystem data collection.
USML-unique DMS hardware includes local controllers (one per
experiment rack), dedicated processors (Process Fluids, Payload Waste,
Payload Support, Video) plus miscellaneous hardware.
2.1.13.4 Environmental Control and Life Suooort System (ECLSSI-
TBS.
2.1.13.5 Thermal Control Subsystem (TCSI - TB'S.
2.1.13.6 Software - USML software consists of the applications
software required to execute the MTL functions via the local controllers and
dedicated MTL processors. Safety significant functions of MTL S/W include:
• Caution and Warning interface with SSDMS
• Experiment control
• Malfunction detection and automated contingency control.
2.1.13.7 Vacuum Vent - The USML Vacuum Vent subsystem
provides a high-quality vacuum resource (10 -3 tort) to support experiment
activities. The vacuum vent is essentially divided into two independent systems,
one on each side of the module aisle. Each system consists of 15 cm (6 in. i.d.)
primary vent lines with 5 cm (2 in. i.d.) secondary lines that provide vacuum
access for each rack, plus the necessary isolation valves and interconnect
hardware.
Note the the Vacuum Vent subsystem is intended to provide a
vacuum resource only, and is not intended for overboard disposal of gaseous
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DESIGN
TBS
FIGURE 2.1-45. TBS
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waste products (waste disposal is accomplished via the PMMS). Because the
Vacuum Vent provides a substantial diameter access to space vacuum, it is
essential that adequate design features be incorporated to preclude inadvertent
dumping of MTL atmosphere. (See Figure 2.1-46.)
2.1.13.8 Process Materials Manaaement System (PMMS_- The
PMM$ provides two major functions: storage/resupply of process fluids and
safe handling, removal, storage, and disposal of MTL payload waste products.
Process fluids considered to be MTL provided include:
• Hydrogen gas
• Helium gas
• Nitrogen gas
• Argon gas
• Oxygen gas
• Carbon dioxide gas
• Freon gas
• WaIer.
M'rL waste products come from the various experiment operations
(including glovebox operations).
2.1.13.9 Laboratory Suoc)ort F_.auic_ment . Laboratory Support
Equipment includes those items required to support on-orbit experimental
procedures and evaluation of the results. Specific items are TBS.
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Vacuum Vent
TBS
FIGURE 2.1-46. TBS
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3.1 HAZARDS
To date, the PSA has identified 39 potential SSFF hazards (29 for
flight hardware, 10 for GSE), many with applicability to more than one element
and/or subsystem. The hazards identified are listed in Tables 3.1-1 and 3.1-2.
Element applicability and a reference to the supporting hazard report (Appendix
A) are noted in the table. Hazards involving GSE, GFP, and some MTL will be
identified and assessed later.
3.2 ASSESSMENT TO DATE
The assessment to date has consisted of reviewing the derived
requirements shown necessary by the PSA versus available design data. In
most cases, design data details available to fully assess compliance are
insufficient. Therefore, an assessment of the impact of derived requirements on
the design was attempted.
The majority of the inherent SSFF hazards identified can be
satisfactorily controlled with design features or operational constraints with
minimal impact if implemented at this point in the program. "Satisfactorily
Controlled" meaning controlled to the minimum acceptable level specified by
NASA in SS-SRD-0001, NHB 1700.7B, and KHB 1700.7A.
Exceptions to the above are discussed below.
.3.2.1 SSFF
Many hazards associated with SSFF appear to be controllable via the
identified methods (refer to Appendix A), although certain unknowns and
potential problem areas continue to exist. These items are discussed below.
3.2.1.1 Containment of Hazardous Materials Durina Processina.
Amooule Failure. and Maintenance- TBS
3.2.1.2 Vacuum Vent Safety - TBS
3.2.1.3 Safety Accommodation Reauirements - Although USML
subsystems will provide a measure of design safety in support of experiment
operations, it is possible that USML safety provisions will not totally mitigate a
given hazard in every case. In some cases, no specific USML hazard control
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TABLE 3.1-1. PRELIMINARY SSFF HAZARD LIST (Sheet 1 of 2)
(Reports contained in Appendix A)
SUBSYSTEM/HAZARD TITLE
Release of Hazardous Material into Habitable Area
(Processing Phase)
Release of Hazardous Material into Habitable Area
(Pre- or Postprocsssing)
Hazardous Touch Temperatures
Rupture of Pressure Vessel/Lines and Fittings/
Components
Loss of Cooling
Exposure of Crew to Frangible Materials
Electrical Shock
Ignition Sources
Toxic Offgassing of Materials in Habitable Areas
Use of Flammable Matedale
Structural Failure Due to Launch, Flight, and
Stress Corrosion
Exposure of STS or Space Station Electrical
Systems to EMI
Software Control of Cdtical Func_ons
Inadvertent Mixing o! Reactive Chemicals Leading
to Exothermic Reactions, Corrosion, Toxic Offgassing
Chemical Reaction in CM Venting SysterwWaste
Stowage
Personal Injury or Equipment Damage Due to Improper
Handling/Operating Equipment/Procedures
Inability to Vent/Clean Up
TBD
Loss of Power
Equipment Damage Due to Improper Electrical Interface
NUMBER
SSFF-FLT-1
SSFF-FLT-2
SSFF-FLT-3
SSFF-FLT-4
SSFF-FLT-5
SSFF-FLT-6
SSFF-FLT-7
SSFF-FLT-8
SSFF-FLT-9
SSFF-FLT°I 0
SSFF-FLT-11
SSFF-FLT-12
SSFF-FLT-13
SSFF-FLT-14
SSFF-FLT-15
SSFF-FLT-16
SSFF-FLT-17
SSFF-FLT-18
SSFF- FLT- 19
SSFF-FLT-20
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PRELIMINARY SSFF HAZARD LIST (Sheet 2 of 2)
(Reports contained in Appendix A)
SUBSYSTEM/HAZARD TITLE
i
Ignition of Flammable Atmosphere
Leak in Water Coolant System
Release of Inerting Gas into USML
Crew Overexposure to Onboard Radiation
Crew Exposure to Excessive Acoustic Noise
Finger Traps/Pinch Points
Crew Exposure to Sharp Edges/Comers
Leakage (QDs, etc.)
Release of Conductive Particulates
GROUND
Rupture of Pressure Vessel/IJnes/Rffings/Components
Pinch Points/Entrapments (Personnel)
Flammable/Ignition Sources
Electrical Shock
Structural Failure from Induced Loads
Pressure Testing
Equipment Damage Due to Improper Equipment
Interface Connections
Injury to Personnel and/or Equipment Damage Due
to Obstructions/Tripping Hazards
Inadvertent Operations of Controls Resulting in
Personnel Injury/Equipment Damage
Excessive Acoustical Noise (GSE)
NUMBER
SSFF-FLT-21
SSFF-FLT-22
88FF-FLT-23
SSFF-FLTo24
SSFF-FLT-25
SSFF-FLT-26
SSFF-FLT-27
SSFF-FLT-28
SSFF-FLT-29
SSFF-GRND-1
SSFF-GRND-2
SSFF-GRND-3
SSFF-GRND-4
SSFF-GRND-5
SSFF-GRND-6
SSFF-GRND-7
SSFF-GRND-8
SSFF-GRND-9
SSFF-GRND- 10
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will exist because of a lack of commonality among experiments; in other cases it
may be impossible or impractical to implement all hazard controls at the USML
level. For this reason, safety accommodation requirements are needed to
ensure thatthe experimenter provides a level of safety and failure tolerance
sufficient to guarantee that system-level safety is consistent with program
requirements.
Safety accommodation requirements should be structured to ensure
an adequate level of safety without undue restriction on experiment design and
activity.
3.2.1.4 Lab Eauioment Develooment - A general safety concern
associated with the lab equipment (and with USMI.. operations in general) is
that the techniques and hardware for the subject applications have evolved in
the Earth laboratory environment where gravity and near-unlimited ventilation
capabilities are taken for granted. It is assumed that the off-the-shelf required
lab equipment will be used where possible to minimize program costs. Special
attention will be required to ensure that all aspects are considered.in evaluating
the safe use of off-the-shelf hardware and Earth-developed laboratory
techniques in the USML environment.
Areas of special concern include:
• Containment of hazardous materials
• High voltage, X-radiation and EMI associated with the magnetic
suppression and other potentially high EM-field-producing
equipment
• Segregation of potentially reactive products within gloveboxes
• Ignition source control
• Detection of toxic matedal and frangible matedal failures.
3.2..1.5 ECLSS Interfaces - A number of potential atmospheric
contaminants generated by SSFF experiment operations are toxic. Other
contaminants, although not by themselves hazardous, could intera.ct with
substances or equipment present within USML to create hazardous conditions.
Severity of some of the hazards associated with USML experiment chemical
usage depends on (1) detection, (2) containment, and (3) the effectiveness of
3-4
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the ECLSS at removing these from the habitable atmosphere. This interface
will require careful evaluation to ensure compatibility.
3.2.1.6 Safety-Critical Power Source - The current EPS concept
provides two redundant power sources to each experiment rack. Since the
$SFF expedments are at least potentially hazardous, one of the following
measures will be required to ensure experiment safety in the event of failure of
both power buses (i.e., to maintain the required two-failure tolerance):
• The experiment hardware will, via passive measures, have to
revert to a safe state upon loss of input power.
• Backup batteries could be employed for experiments requiring
power to achieve safe status. However, the batteries would
potentially induce additional hazards.
• A third power so0rce could be added. This approach has proved
successful on Spacelab.
3.2.1.7 Sea reqation of Waste Products - USML waste management
provisions allow removal of only a few preapproved, "acceptable" wastes and
subsequent purge of the removal system itself. USML does not provide the
capability for waste removal or segregation beyond this. The o;verall scheme of
hazard control, therefore, will have to use procedural controls such as materials
restrictions, operational timelining, periodic purge of waste removal provisions,
etc., to ensure incompatible or mutually reactive materials are not vented or
brought together. This concern is of particular significance, also, to the use of
gloveboxes. Enforcement will presumably occur via safety accommodation
requirements (see para. 3.2.1.<3).
3.3 RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL STUDIES
In the process of doing the PSA, specific areas were identified where
additional studies may be warranted, as follows:
• Areas where the required hazard control measures are not within
the state of the art or are limited by the state of the art
Areas where previous NASA decisions have driven the current
baseline to a point where the risks may not be acceptable given
the hazards iden,tified in the PSA.
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Areas meeting the above criteria are listed and discussed in
Table 3.3-1.
3.4 FUTURE EFFORT
This PSA will be continued throughout the conceptual phase as
necessary to affect design, operations, and requirements development. Results
will be documented and maintained so they can be transitioned to the
PDR/Phase 0/I analysis (an essential aspect of the PSA). Concerns, open
items, and recommendations that result from the continuing PSA effort will be
forwarded to NASA, as necessary.
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TABLE 3.3-1. RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL STUDIES
PROPOSED STUDY RATIONALE
Coolant System Designs
Effect of Not Being Able to
Vent Toxic Gases and/or
Dump Same into Waste
Storage
Ill
Sample Failure Detection
Schemes/Devices
Cooling, heat rejection systems using water
or air should be studied to assess the impacts
and design options available to ensure
control of hazards resulting from loss of
cooling to avionics systems and furnaces; use
of QDs; maintenance activities; furnace
runaway overpowering the cooling system;
and leaks into the habitable volume of
USMLJSS.
Alternative approaches should be studied
such as a dedicated SSFF waste storage
medium to handle possible sample leaks or
failures which otherwise would prevent
cleanup and/or repairs on-orbit; or constraint
sample selection to the very least toxic
elements.
This proposed study is seen as a must if
SSFF is to operate as planned and crew
access and maintenance are to be performed.
Science development of failure detection
methods is currently being pursued for the
CGF project. Other, more expensive, and
massive methods/equipment are also
available, such as mass spectrometers, etc.,
and will have to be traded off.
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APPENDIX A
SPACE STATION FURNACE FACILITY
HAZARD REPORTS
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PRELIMINARY SSFF HAZARD LIST (GROUND OPERATIONS)
SUBSYSTEM/HAZARD TITLE
GROUND
Rupture of Pressure Vessel/LJnes/Fiffings/Components
Ptnch PolntstEntrapments (Personnel)
Rammable/Ignition Sources
Electrical Shock
Structural Failure from Induced Loads
Pressure Testing
Equipment Damage Due to Improper Equipment
Inter/ace Connections
Injury to Personnel and/or Equipment Damage Due
to Obst ructions/TdppingHazards
Inadvertent Operations of Controls Resulting in
Personnel Injury/Equipment Damage
Excessive Acoustical Noise (GSE)
NUMBER
SSFF-GRND-1
SSFF-GRND-2
SSFF-GRND-3
SSFF-GRND-4
SSFF-GRND-5
SSFF-GRND-6
SSFF-GRND-7
SSFF-GRND-8
SSFF-GRND-9
SSFF-GRND- 10
i=
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APPENDIX B
LARGE BORE BRIDGMAN FURNACE
AND
HIGH-PRESSURE FURNACE
STUDY
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The purpose of this report is to summarize the findings of the study
being performed to determine the impact on the Space Station Furnace Facility
(SSFF) of accommodating a Large Bore Bridgman (LBB) Furnace and a High-
Pressure Furnace (HPF). This report is part of a research study entitled "Space
Station Fumace Facility," and the analyses and investigations presented are
intended to fulfill paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5 of the statement of work. I
The work was done by the Teledyne Brown Engineering Advanced
Programs Division, through Marshall Space Flight Center, for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
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The LBB provides the capability for controlled directional solidification
experiments on large diameter samples. The HPF is intended for processing in
environments at pressures up to 100 atmospheres.
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The Furnace Module consists of a furnace with a hot zone, an
adiabatic layer, and a cold zone. The furnaces are installed within
environmental canisters for containment of toxic vapors. The furnace operating
environment will be inert with a pressure of up to 2 atmospheres. A negative
pressure difference between the canister and the lab environment must be
maintained. Both furnaces will have a bore of approximately 8 cm in diameter.
The hot zone of the LBB will be approximately 60 cm long to accommodate a
55-cm long sample, and the hot zone of the HPF will be approximately 30 cm
long to accommodate a 25-cm long sample. There will be several
independently controlled heaters in the hot zones, including booster heaters.
During directional solidification, the LBB will utilize furnace translation rather
than sample translation to minimize induced accelerations to the sample. A
schematic of the complete LBB system in the SSFF is shown in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1. LARGE BORE BRIDGMAN C(3NCEPT
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Rough estimates of the resource requirements of the LBB and HPF
were dedved from the most recent available data on similar smaller scale
materials processing furnaces and from information contained in the
Miorogravity and Materials Processing Facility (MMPF) data base. These
values were compared to those of the Crystal Growth Facility (CGF) and are
presented in Table 1. The values indicate that the LBB and HPF are drivers of
power, thermal cooling, venting, consumables, mass, and volume. The data
requirements are not impacted much since the motor control of the furnaces
defines this requirement and will probably be the same for all three furnace
modules.
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LARGE BORE BRIDGMAN AND HIGH-PRESSURE FURNACE
IMPACTS
Mass of Furnace and Canister (kg)
Height of Canister (cm)
Diameter of Canister (cm)
Maximum Power (W)
Thermal Requirement (W)
(Nominal)
Purge Gas Volume, liters (STP)
LBB HPF CGF
3500 1635 187.6
396 180 165.3
150 75 66.1
25000 25000 2100
15000 15000 1000
7200 1050 4.449
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Some of the numerous critical issues associated with accommodating
the LBB and HPF modules are as follows:
• The magnitudes of the stored energy in these Furnace Modules
are a potential safety hazard.
Since it is anticipated that the SSFF will have to provide the gases
for the inert atmospheres of the furnace canisters, the volumes of
gas required are critical.
• The exhaust gases of the modules must also be stored in the
SSFF since venting may be restricted because of toxicity.
The power and thermal requirements are values which are
expected to be accommodated far into the future of Space Station
development.
• The mass and volume requirements preclude the use of standard
rack mounting.
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APPENDIX C
AMPOULE, SAMPLE EXCHANGE, AND
TRANSLATION MECHANISMS
STUDY
INTRODUCTION
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Teledyne Brown Engineering has begun work on the conceptual
design of the Space Station Furnace Facility (SSFF). The SSFF is a muttiuser
facility capable of supporting a wide variety of experimentation in solidification
physics and crystal growth. The preliminary definition of this facility has defined
a variety of unique Furnace Modules which can be integrated into a common
support system and structure for mission-particular experimentation. A contract
for the conceptual design of this common support system and structure was
awarded to TBE with Authority To Proceed given on June 2, 1989, and the
contract was signed on August 31, 1989. The contract specified many trade
studies to be performed in support of the conceptual design effort. On
September 11, 1989, a Science Requirements Workshop was held to review
the progress and priority of the work being performed with the science
community. After a review of the tasks listed in the contract statement of work,
the trade studies concerning the ampoule mounting, translation mechanisms,
and sample exchange (paragraphs 5.5.3, 5.5.4, and 5.5.5, respectively) were
considered by the science community to be of low priodty and. dependent on the
designs of the unique Furnace Modules. Because of the immaturity of many of
the Furnace Module designs, it was decided to minimize the effort for these
analyses.
This report is a summary of the work performed under the following
tasks:
5.5.3 Hot Amooule Exchanae
• Must sample cool before exchange
• Does sample cool in facility or in separate sample holder
5.5.4 Amooule Mountina
• Position accuracy
• Support one or both ends of ampoule
• Is rotation capability required
• Thermocouple interface
• Universal holder versus several specialized
C-2
PREIBE-ENNG P/__-,E BLANK NOT RLMED
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
5.5.5 Translation Mechanism
* Ampoule loading
. Ampoule translation
. Sample differential translation (float zone)
To adequately complete these trade studies, specific information
pertaining to furnace module designs is required. This level of detail may not
be available until a furnace module nears a Critical Design Review (CDR)
completion. More detailed assessments of these issues should be performed
as the furnace modules reach the preliminary and critical phases of design.
5.5.3 Hot Amooule Exchanae
A trade study on the benefits and merits of hot ampoule exchange
was performed. The issue is whether the ampoule should be allowed to cool in
the furnace core or removed hot and allowed to cool in a separate facility. Hot
ampoule removal has the potential advantage of reducing sample processing
time by the sum of the sample-furnace core cooidown time and the furnace core
heatup time. The advantages and disadvantages of each technique are listed
below.
Exchange Hot Ampoule
Disadvantages
• Processing time savings
• Furnace is not thermally cycled
during each ampoule change
• Bum hazard exists with manual
exchange
• Ampoule breakage toxicity hazard
in cases where sample materials
are toxic at high vapor pressures
• If an ampoule exchange carousel
is used, the hot ampoule will
radiate to other ampoules in the
carousel
• A separate ampoule cooling can-
ister may be necessary because of
the above issue
• Added experimental parameter
due to the unknown cooling rate
C-3
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breakage
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Disadvantaaes
Lost processing time
For the case of electronic materials processing (crystal growth), the
sample exchange time compared to the sample processing time is small;
therefore, it is felt that the small amount of time saved does not warrant the
increased risks and complexity of hot ampoule exchange. However, in the case
of metals and alloys experiments, the relatively short processing time (4 to 8
hours) may warrant the addition of a hot ampoule exchange system. In cases
where higher cooling rates than allowed by the core heat loss rate are required
by the experiment, a separate sample holder-container may be required.
Cooling of the hot ampoule in a separate holder is investigated in the next
study. A hot ampoule exchange design concept is also illustrated.
Cool in Furnace Core or Seoarate Holder
A trade study was performed to determine the benefits and difficulties
involved in incorporating a separate sample container to allow out-of-furnace
ampoule cooling. Such a system may be required on short-duration experi-
ments or in cases where sample cooling rate may be an important experimental
parameter. The advantages and disadvantages of each system are listed
below.
Cool Sample in Separate Sample Container
• Offers an additional level of con-
tainment in case of an ampoule
rupture during cooldown
• Isolates the hot ampoule from the
rest of the system and other
ampoules
Disadvantaoes
• More complex system; greater cost
• Difficult to adapt to existing furnace
concepts such as CGF. The addi-
tion of a container to the existing
design would lengthen the furnace
by -30 in.
• Thermocouplelsensor outputs from
the ampoule may be more difficult
to configure
C-4
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Cool Sample in Furnace Core
Advantaaes Disadvantages
• Simplified design; lower cost
• Lower rack space requirement
• Requires more processing time per
sample
• Fixed cooling rate
In cases where the experiment run time is short or where cooling
rates may be higher than allowed by the furnace core, it may be necessary to
incorporate a separate cooling canister. Ampoules could be loaded into the
furnace core by an exchange arm and then unloaded back into a cooling
canister. This concept is not easily adapted to any of the baseline furnace
configurations and would require further' study. A design concept for such a
system is illustrated in Figure I. The addition of a load-unload ampoule
container to the CGF carousel would require increasing the length of the
furnace core and would place it outside the boundaries allowed by the rack
space (Figure II).
5.5.4 Amooule Mountina-Universal Holder Versus Several
Soecialized Holders
The SSFF contract identifies the issue of utilizing a universal ampoule
holder. The advantages and disadvantages of universal and specialized
holders are listed below.
Universal Ampoule Holder
Disadvantaaes
• Common holder design; possible
cost savings
• Easier to design into an automatic
ampoule exchange system
• Sensor output limited by common
connection constraints
• Matedal compatibility - difficult to
design for when ampoule material
may be an unknown
• Limitation on therrnocouple types
It would be advantageous to incorporate a universal ampoule holder
or fixture into the furnace design. The design could be configured such that
each ampoule utilized an adapter flange which incorporated any of the
ampoule unique features required. A design concept is illustrated in Figure III.
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This feature would make it much easier to incorporate an automated sample
exchange system into the furnace design. However, because of the immaturity
of the-furnace module design concepts, it is recommended that this issue be set
aside for further study.
Suooort One or Both Ends of Amo_ule
A trade study was performed to determine the advantages of
supporting the sample ampoule on both ends as opposed to one end only. The
advantages and disadvantages of both configurations are listed below.
Support Ampoule on One End
Advantaaes Disadvantaaes
• Reduced heat loss out the end of
the ampoule
• Furnace core may be closed on
one end; reduced heat losses
• Reduced sample end effect on hot
zone side
• Easier to accommodate ampoule
thermal expansion
• Less rigid ampoule mounting
• Ampoule alignment may be more
difficult
Support Ampoule on Both Ends
Disadvantage_
• Increased rigidity
• During ground-based tests the
lower support reduces any poten-
tial problems with ampoule creep
and failures at elevated
temperatures
• Aids in ampoule alignment
• Axial thermal expansion of the
ampoule must be accommodated
• Increased heat load-ends effects
• A longer ampoule may be required
• Requires the furnace core to be
open at both ends
• To accommodate a multiple
exchange system, the ampoule
must be loaded through the
furnace core on the lower support
Sample support on one end only offers several advantages over a
two-support system and is preferred. Figure IV shows a conceptual design for a
C-9
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two-support system. The greater simplicity of a single support negates any
potential advantages of increased rigidity.
positionina Accuracy
The contract specifies an ampoule position accuracy of -.L-0.1cm with a
resolution of 0.01 cm. It is not clear whether these numbers reflect axial and
radial accuracy or concentricity with the furnace bore. Ampoule position and/or
position measurement accuracy is a function of:
• The straightness of the ampoule
• Angular misalignment in the sample holder
• The positioning accuracy of the sample exchange mechanism
• The accuracy of positioning the sample in the ampoule
- The location of the ampoule position with respect to a reference
point on the furnace core is controlled by the thermal expansion
characteristics of the ampoule and the furnace structure
• Position measurement accuracy with respect to a reference point
on the furnace core is controlled by the resolution and accuracy of
the position sensor - LVDT, Linear Potentiometer, optical encoder,
etc.
Because of the equipment-specific nature of this issue, it is
recommended that the issue be deferred to the furnace core manufacturer.
Is Rotation Caoabilitv Reauired
The issue of ampoule end rotation appears to be experiment specific.
It is felt that the issue be deferred until experiment requirements are better
developed.
Sam ole Differential Transl_tjon (Float Zoqe_
No float zone furnaces are identified in the candidate baseline.
Thermocouole lnterf_,ce
This study addresses the location of the ampoule thermocouple lead
wire termination point and how the TC lead wire connection is made.
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Considerations involved with this issue are:
* Automated or manual sample exchange
o Accommodation of a variety of thermocouple types
• Lead wire length
• Ampoule mounting.
The feature of automatic or manual exchange is required by the
contract. If the ampoule is designed to be loaded and unloaded automatically
by an exchange mechanism, then each ampoule must have a common end
configuration or adapter to allow it to be coupled to the exchange arm. The
thermocouple connection point should be integral with the ampoule coupler.
The TC-sensor connection plug should be designed to allow for both automated
coupling and manual coupling. The contract guidelines and assumptions
statement require that the design allow for six to eight thermocouples per
sample. Utilizing only one thermocouple type would require 16 thermocouple
connection points per ampoule. If the ampoule exchange arm connector is
designed to allow for 3 thermocouple types, 48 thermocouple connection points
are required.
The connection point might either be a pin-type connector or a series
of radial "pads" around the exchange mechanism adapter on the end of the
ampoule. Due to the equipment-specific nature of this study, it is recommended
that the final decision be deferred to the furnace core manufacturer.
5.5.5 Translation Mechanism
Common Translation System
The furnace translation system may be either furnace-core unique or
common with the rack. The advantages and disadvantages of each system are
listed below.
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Common Translation Mechanism
Advantage8 Disadvantages
• Lower cost; common components
• The drive components may be
better isolated from the fumace
environment
• The translation rates required may
be accommodated by a common
system
• It may'be very difficult to design a
translation system to accom-
modate the wide variety of furnace
configurations, shapes, and
lengths
• The furnace core design would be
driven by the translation rack
space requirements
• For the case of furnace translation
it will be more difficult to maintain
atmospheric integrity of the furnace
co re
(Bellows may be required)
• This configuration requires a more
modular furnace design and
possibly more setup time
Translation Mechanism Integral with Furnace Core
Oisadvantaaes
• The entire fumace apparatus is
contained in a single enclosure as
in CGF, AADSF, and MASA.
• Reduced setup time upon experi-
ment changeout
• Similar to existing designs
• The furnace core design is not
driven by the need to couple to a
common translation rack
• Potentially higher cost
The use of a common translation system has many potential problems
which may be difficult to solve. Therefore, it is recommended that the use of a
common translation system be abandoned in favor of the use of common
translation system components such as motors and drive screws. The
translation system for each furnace core could be designed from a catalogue of
common flight-certified components. This inventory of flight-certified
components would be developed and maintained by the SSFF Project.
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Amooule Translation Versus Furnace Translation
Directional solidification requires controlled relative motion between
the furnace and the sample during processing. The goal is to minimize
acceleration imposed on the sample by the translation mechanism or changes
in translation velocity. The SSFF contract requires a maximum g level of 10-4.
To achieve the required relative motion, either the furnace or ampoule must be
translated. The advantages and disadvantages of each technique are listed
below.
Fumace Translation
_LCJ[Y._ Disadvanta0es
• Minimize the acceleration imposed
on the sample by the translation
mechanism - the sample sees no
accelerations from speed changes
(other than drive train vibration)
• Easier to accommodate a multiple
sample exchange mechanism.
The exchange system must be
integral with the translation system
in a sample translation configura-
tion.
• Requires more rack space; two
complete furnace core volumes
are required
• Furnace translation requires a
higher torque capacity drive
system
Sample Translation
I_isadvantaqes
• Cables associated with power,
cooling, sensors, etc., are not
required to move
• It is possibly easier to have a
common translation system with
this configuration
• More exposure to drive system
vibration and acceleration
Fumace translation is preferred because of the g-level requirement of
the contract. Furnace translation reduces the magnitude of acceleration
disturbances imposed on the sample by drive system noise and translation rate
changes.
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Amooule Loadino
The contract states that the furnace be capable of both manual and
automated ampoule loading. This requirement is closely tied with the "require-
ments of section 5.5.3 in the contract and cannot be treated as an independent
issue. Several ampoule loading schemes can be envisioned.
• Direct loading by hand into the ampoule-holding fixture
• Automatic loading by a carousel
• Automatic loading by an exchange arm from an ampoule carousel
canister (Figure I)
• Automatic loading by a fully articulated robotic system
Design issues:
• Does the loading mechanism interfere with the ampoule being
manually loaded?
• Will the automatic loading device be capable of meeting the
ampoule alignment requirements or will a separate alignment
mechanism be required?
• Does the design allow for hot ampoule exchange?
• How are thermocouple lead wires and sensor wires routed
through the exchange mechanism?
• Does the loading mechanism allow for variation in ampoule
lengths?
• How will the exchange mechanism - ampou'le holder be protected
from heat conduction up the ampoule?
• If the ampoule is loaded from a separate container, does the
ampoule storage container share a common vacuum and backfill
system with the furnace?
• Are motion points or mechanical joints in the exchange mecha-
nism designed to be self-locking or do they require active control
to maintain a given position?
0"15
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FURNACE POINTING
STUDY
SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
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The purposes of this study are to determine the feasibility and
develop a concept for a furnace pointing system. This system will be part of the
Space Station Furnace Facility (SSFF).
This system will be used to align the furnace axis parallel to the resid-
ual gravity vector on the space station. The residual gravity vector is composed
of the air drag component and the gravity-gradiant component. Other accelera-
tion inducing steady-state disturbances such as light pressure are considered to
be several orders of magnitude less. The gravity-gradient force is produced by
the radial variation in the force of gravity about the space station center of mass.
An object will only experience a zero gravity gradient if it is positioned along the
flight path of the space station's center of mass. The current configuration for
the Space Station Freedom (SSF) will place the U.S. lab module approximately
12 m from the space station Center of Mass (CM). This displacement will
impose an Earth-directed component of 3 x 10 -6 g (-.lp.g per meter) and a CM-
directed component along the truss axis of 1 x 10 -6 g on the furnace module
• (worst-base assumptions based on the current configuration). The magnitude
and direction of the gravity-gradient components are considered to be constant
in the study as the center of mass position of the space station will be
considered to be unchanging.
The air drag force is produced by atmospheric drag at the orbital alti-
tude. This component is cyclic in nature and varies at approximately two cycles
per orbit. The magnitude of the air drag component varies significantly with
atmospheric conditions and is a function of solar flux, diurnal.bulge, orbital
altitude, time of year, and projected area of the space station. This study will
consider two cases: where the air drag is of the same magnitude as the gravity
gradient (maximum of 3 xl0 -6 g) and where the maximum air drag is one order
of magnitude less than the gravity gradient. The scenario in which both
components are of the same order of magnitude represents a worst-case
orientation.
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The pointing system will be required to maintain a preferred align-
ment (based on the particular science requirements of the experiment) with the
residual gravity vector.-- The benefits of both an active and passive alignment
system will be weighted. This study must also determine any disturbances
induced on the furnace module by the pointing system. The sense and magni-
tude of the gravity vector and the preferred orientation will be determined and
controlled by an a¢celerometer subsystem. The system must be capable of
accommodating a variety of furnace module shapes and allow on-orbit module
interchangeability.
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L ROTATION LIMITS AND DISTURBANCES
The first step required by this study is to determine the disturbances
induced On the furnace module by the pointing system. Rotational-induced
disturbances are based on maximum normal and tangential acceleration
components of 10 -6 g. Furnace dimensions are based on the Crystal Growth
Furnace (CGF) design and assume tracking rotation about the furnace center of
mass. A worst-case radius from the center of rotation to the sample of 1.7 ft was
used. The maximum allowable angular velocity was calculated to be 4.4 x 10 "3
rad/sec or 15 deg/min. The tangential velocity based on O_rnaxwas calculated to
be 0.007 ft/sec with a minimum acceleration time to (Omax of 217 sec. Based on
these numbers, the maximum angular acceleration (ccmax) is
2.0 x 10 -5 rad/sec 2. Based on CGF, the torque induced by rotating the fur-
nace at o_max is 1.7 x 10 -2 oz-in. The torque required to rotate the furnace at
_zmax is unlikely to produce any disturbance on a structure as massive as the
space station. Other potential disturbance sources are:
• Stiction in the rotation bearing system
• Drive train noise
• Connection hose binding and interaction.
Calculations of the furnace position during the orbital period are
based on a 10-3 Hz variation of air drag ranging in magnitude from 3 x10 -6 g to
3 x 10 -7 g. Based on the gravity-gradient contour plots and the furnace posi-
tion shown in Figure 1, the gravity-gradient components were found to be
1.0 x 10 -6 g along the truss axis and 3x10 -6 g in the Earth direction. These
components produce a resultant of 3.16 x 10 -6 g magnitude at a direction 18
deg off the Earth direction axis. The furnace module will need to be tilted at an
18-deg angle to maintain alignment with this component. The air drag
component of 3 x 10 -6 g requires a tilt angle of 44 deg from Earth direction for
parallel alignment. An air drag component of 3 x 10 -7 g requires a tilt angle of 5
deg from Earth direction. Based on these two angles, the furnace must rotate
through a 39-deg angle, four times per orbit, or rotate through 39 deg during a
22-rain period in a worst-case scenario.
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FIGURE 1. CONTOURS OF CONSTANT GRAVITY GRADIENT
ACCELERATION IN PLANE PERPENDICULAR TO THE PATH OF THE
SPACECRAFT'S CENTER OF GRAVITY (450 km ORBIT)
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Assuming the worst case, variation in air drag will be 3 x 10 -6 g -
(3 x 10 -7 g) or 2.7 x 10-6 g; the average angular velocity will be 5.0 x 10-4
rad/sec. This is well below the calculated maximum of 4.4 x 10-3 rad/sec. The
rotation about the furnace CG of 5.0 x 10-4 rad/sec will produce a normal
acceleration component of 10- 8g.
This rotation-induced component must be added to the residual grav-
ity component; however, since this component is almost two orders of magni-
tude below the resultant residual acceleration component, there would appear
to be no significant penalty from rotating the furnace from a disturbance stand-
point. See Figure 2.
Based on a limiting tangential acceleration of 10 -6 g, the minimum
time to reach O_avgfrom a standstill is 13 sec. Angular velocity and acceleration
values based on a sinusoidal air drag variation during the orbital period have
also been estimated. The maximum angular velocity based on a sinusoidal air
drag force variation is 8.21 x 10-4 rad/se¢, which produces a maximum normal
acceleration component of 3.55 x 10-8 g. The maximum resultant acceleration
due to furnace rotation is 1.2 x 10.7 g. A plot of the total rotation-induced
acceleration imposed on the furnace is shown in Figure 3.
Assuming a more optimistic estimate of air drag variation from3 x 10 -7
to3 x 10 -8 g (or a one order of magnitude difference in the maximum values of
air drag and gravity gradient), the furnace is required to rotate from 0 to 5.5 dog.
The maximum acceleration imposed on the sample by this rotation is
2.8 x 10"10g.
II. PASSIVE VERSUS ACTIVE ORIENTATION
Because of possible cost and space impacts, a passive alignment
system has also been investigated. A passive system will not actively track the
residual gravity vector; however, the furnace will still be gimbailed to allow ori-
entation with a predetermined "average" g-vector direction that will yield the
minimum off-axis disturbance. The passive system would save costs because
of the lack of a drive system, drive control electronics, and a dedicated
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accelerometer system. A passive system could be designed to align with the
gravity-gradient component only (rotation on one axis only) or align with the
resultant of the gravity gradient and the average air drag component (rotation
on two axes).
Alignment with the gravity-gradient component only will produce a
cyclic orientation error equal to the air drag component. Alignment with the
average (worst case) air drag vector orientation at 25 deg from the Earth
direction axis will produce a maximum off-axis acceleration component of
1.4 x10 -6 g. See Figure 4. Fixed alignment with the average air drag force
position (2.5 deg), if the maximum air drag force is 3 x 10 -7 g, yields an off-axis
acceleration component of 5 x 10 -7 g.
- The passive-active system trade will be determined by the maximum
air drag force, the orientation system tracking accuracy, and the maximum off-
axis acceleration component allowed by the science requirements. Three
cases are examined.
C,ase.Z
a) Air drag varies from 3 x 10 -6 to 3 x 10-7 g.
b) Tracking accuracy is 1.0 deg.
c) Gravity gradient is 3 x 10 -6 g.
d) Two double rack spaces are available.
These conditions yield a maximum off-axis acceleration component of
1.4 x 10 "6 g if the furnace is in a stationary position 24 deg from the Earth
direction axis ( this is the rotation midpoint position). The resultant position of
the two dominant acceleration components varies from -5 to 44 deg. A tracking
accuracy of +1.0 deg, if an active system is incorporated, will produce a
maximum off-axis error component of 7.3 x 10-8g.
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Case2
a) Air drag varies from 3 x 10 -6 to 3 x 10-7 g.
b) Gravity gradient is 3 x 10 -6 g.
c) Tracking accuracy is 1.0 deg.
d) Only one double rack Space is available
These conditions produce a maximum off-sample axis acceleration
component of 1.9 x 10 -6 g if the furnace is in a stationary position 17 deg from
the Earth direction axis (this is the maximum rotation angle in the double rack).
The 1.0-deg tracking accuracy will produce a maximum off-axis acceleration
component of 1o75 x 10 -7 g.
case3
a) Air drag varies from 10 -6 to 10-7 g.
b) Tracking accuracy is 1 deg.
c) Gravity gradient is 3 x 10"6g.
The resultant position of the two dominant acceleration components
vades from 2 to 18 deg. This variation falls within the space envelope provided
by the standard double rack, therefore active tracking is possible within the
standard double rack space but may not be required due to the maximum off
axis acceleration limit of 1.0 x 10"6g.
The current requirements document specifies a maximum off-axis
accceleration component of 1 x 10"6g below 0,020 hz. Based on this
requirement a passive system is recommended if the maximum air drag is
below this level. An active tracking system is required if the maximum air drag
is above the 1 x 10-6g level.
D-11
SSFF-PSA-001
June 1990
III. FURNACE ORIENTATION SYSTEM
Several concepts for orientation systems have been explored.
basic design parameters for an active system are as follows:
The
:l:20-deg movement required on a radial plane through the lab
module
• 45-deg movement for air drag compensation - this will probably
require a special rack space at least 64 in. wide
• Minimum or no entry into the lab aisle space
• The system must accommodate various sized and shaped furnace
modules
• Hose and electrical connection provision
- Fluid connection
- Inert gas
- Heater power
- Vacuum
-- Instrumentation.
The space requirements for rotation about two axes are shown in
Figure 5. The space required will depend on the furnace diameter, length and
the required angles of rotation. The rotation angles shown in the figure are
based on a 24-in. diameter furnace module, 54 in. long. It becomes
immediately obvious that furnace module containers as large.as CGF will not be
compatible with the system. Furnace modules will probably be required to be at
least 25 percent smaller in length. This will probably produce a corresponding
reduction in sample length.
The impact of a sample size reduction on the science requirements
will need to be determined. If 45-deg rotation on the air drag connection axis is
required, it will be nece.ssary to use two double rack spaces or at least 64 in. of
wall space depending on the furnace size.
Concept I, shown in Figure 6, consists of a tilt stage at the base of the
rack for gravity-gradient correction and the second rotation point for air drag cor-
rection located at the furnace CG position. An L-shaped structure connects the
tilt stage and the rotation gimbal. This configuration has a space disadvantage.
V
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FURNACE
CRADLE
DRIVE
MOTOR
TILT STAGE
FIGURE 6. CONCEPT 1
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The base stage and the arm from the base to the upper rotation
gimbal intrude on the furnace space and limit the rotation angles, furnace
length, and furnace diameter.
Concept II places both of the rotation gimbals in the same plane. See
Figure 7. The gimbai structure is still supported from the base of the rack. This
configuration is more space efficient than concept I and allows both rotation
points to be located in the same plane.
Concept III places both rotation points in the same plane, as in con-
cept II, but uses a special rack which allows mounting of the longitudinal (air
drag) rotation point on the back wall of the rack. See Figure 8. This configu-
ration allows a larger tilt angle and/or furnace module size by elimination of the
rack base support arm. However, this configuration will require the design and
construction of a special lab rack.
If the standard double rack space is used, the furnace length is limited
to 34 in. with a 17-in. diameter (EAC) container (assuming 45-deg air drag
rotation). See Figure 9. Further reductions in furnace diameter will only yield a
length increase of 4 in. Based on the standard rack depth and a 18-deg gravity-
gradient alignment angle, a 24-in. diameter (CGF size) furnace container is
limited to a length of 54 in. With this size furnace container, 59 in. of wall space
is required to accommodate a 45-deg rotationl See Figure 10. The EAC
container diameter of 17 in. will allow a furnace container length of
approximately 64 in. with the standard rack depth and an 18-deg gravity-
gradient tilt angle.
k_ V
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The impact of the reductions in sample diameters and lengths on the
science requirements of potential experiments needs to be examined. The
orientation system will also have impacts on the design of an automated sample
exchange system and may possibly rule out the inclusion of such a system.
A special wide rack poses the additional problem of entry into the lab
module through the 50-in. wide hatch. The problem requires further examina-
tion. One possible concept, shown in Figure 11, would utilize a folding structure
that would fit within the space of two racks. The furnace gimbal assembly would
be mounted on a "backbone" structure. This structure would have foldout arms,
which would connect with the lower rear attach points in the lab module. This
same concept is shown tilted forward in the removal configuration in Figure 12.
The 45-deg rotation requirement in the air drag correction plane may
be reduced to less than 17 deg if reliable air drag calculations show that the air
drag component will always remain at least one order of magnitude below the
gravity-gradient component. A 17-deg maximum rotation angle will allow the
orientation system to fit within the standard double rack space. Furnace module
length will still be restrictecl to 54 in. with a 24-in. diameter.
Since the furnace enclosure cans are likely to be thin walled, a fur-
nace support or cradle will need to be provided to support the furnace module
at the base. The cradle must be designed to provide on-orbit furnace module
interchangeability. The concept for furnace module changeout is shown in
Figure 13. There are two changeout concepts. One concept uses a furnace
module dedicated support cradle. The entire cradle assembly would be
changed with the furnace module. The cradle will be designed so that the dis-
tance between the rotation hubs accommodates the largest diameter furnace
module envisioned.
The cradle would be located by two splined and removable axles.
Module changeout would-involve removing a locking pin, retracting both axles
through the gimbal spindles, and removing the cradle.
All hose and electrical connections would be broken at the support
cradle.
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in the second concept, the support cradle is integral with the rotation
gimbal. The front of the cradle is open to allow removal and insertion of the fur-
nace module. Each furnace module would require a base adapter plate for
connection with the cradle baseplate. Hose and electrical lead breaks would
be made at the base of the furnace module. This system offers potentially
easier module ¢hangeout, but may introduce design restraints on the vadous
furnace modules.
IV.
Vo
SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
• Accelerometer Subsystem
- 10 -7 g sensitivity at 10 -3 Hz or one order of magnitude less
than the minimum acceleration to be measured
• Accelerometer Signal Conditioners
- Filtering and Amplification
• Accelerometer Data Management System
- Processing of signal conditioner output
- Determination of residual g-vector orientation
- Storage of pertinent acceleration data
• Drive Motor Power Supply and Control System
• Drive Motor System and Position Sensors - positioning accuracy
to 1.0 deg
• Flexible connection'system
• Accelerometer calibration system
• Accelerometer vibration isolation system.
SAFETy ISSUES AND HAZARDS
• Flexible connection failure
- Fluid and gas connection
- Power connection
- Vacuum connection
- Instrumentation
-,.=_,/
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• Failure of the rotation system drive mechanism may allow unre-
strained rotation of the furnace module
Crew entry into the furnace motion space. It will probably be nec-
essary to provide torque limiting slip clutches in the rotation mech-
anism
• Crew injury during furnace module changeout.
• Touch Temperature limitations on furnace components protruding
out of the rack envelope.
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ISSUES
I. ACCELEROMETER SYSTEM
A three-axis accelerometersystem is required for the purpose of
determining the residual g-vector direction and magnitude. The accelerometer
system must be capable of measuring accelerations of 10 -7 g at frequencies of
10 -3 Hz. This requirement may be increased to 10 -8 g as the space station
configuration and air drag estimates are refined. The accelerometer should
have a resolution one order of magnitude greater than the minimum
acceleration. Preliminary investigations (TBE Workpackage I) indicate the
Sundstrand QA-2000, Bell Model I!, and the Bell MESA are the only currently
available accelerometers capable of coming close to meeting these
requirements. The QA-2000 and the Model II are marginal at best (10 -6 g).
Tests indicate the Bell MESA accelerometer may have problems with limited
dynamic range and will require extensive vibration isolation. The Sundstrand
Advanced Strap Down Accelerometer (ASDA) looks promising, but it is still in
the development phase. Accelerometer testing at TBE has been terminated
• because of a stop-work order on Workpackage I. It is unsure how verification of
accelerometer performance will be obtained in the future.
II. A(_CELEROMETER CALIBRATION SYSTEM
Accelerometers such as the Sundstrand QA-2000 have exhibited bias
drifts as high as 3 x 10 -7 g/h. Therefore, a periodic calibration technique must
be developed to ensure bias correction.
IlL ACCELEROMETER VIBRATION ISOLATION SYSTEM
Either an active or passive vibration isolation system will be needed
to prevent accelerometer saturation at high noise levels.
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This study has determined that a furnace orientation system is feasi-
ble. The recommended configuration is that which would allow active tracking
of the residual gravity component..This recommendation is based on the
assumptions that the maximum air drag acceleration is of the same order of
magnitude as the gravity gradient acceleration and science requirements
dictate an off-axis acceleration component no greater than 10 -6 g. If the
maximum air drag component falls below 10-6g and the system is limited in
space to one double rack, then a passive orientation system is recommended.
This concept for an active tracking system is illustrated in Figure 14. The
following design features are incorporated in the active tracking system:
• Rotation gimbals in a common plane.
• Furnace modules are base mounted.
• The air drag correction gimbai is wall mounted,
The system will accept a 24-in. diameter, 54-in. long experiment
container (provided rack space requirements are met).
Furnace module umbilical connection breaks are made at the
support cradle.
• Gimbal rotation points are driven by stepper motors in
microstepping mode
Rotation points are driven through worm and anti-backlash worm
gears incorporating a self-locking gear ratio and torque limiting
slip clutches. Gear train related noise will need to be investi-
gated. 1
The gimbai support system folds to allow for hatch clearance
(requires further study).
45-deg rotation on the air drag correction axis; 20-deg rotation on
the gravity gradient correction axis (assuming the worst possible
case situation where air drag and gravity gradient are of the same
magnitude) 2
1 There do not appear to be any problems with bearing related
noise or stiction at the low angular velocities. It is recommended
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TBS
FIGORE 14. ACTIVE TRACKING SYSTEM CONCEPT
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that a wet lubricant be used, that the bearings be preloaded, and
the bearings be sized to allow at least one complete ball rotation.
2 The air drag correction axis rotation requirement may be reduced
to 17 deg. This will allow the system to fit within a standard double
rack space. The air drag acceleration force must be one order of
magnitude less than the gravity-gradient acceleration force.
The conclusions are based on the following assumptions:
• The U.S. lab module is located at the position shown in Figure 1.
• 3 x 10"6g gravity gradient component.
• Air drag axis parallel with lab module longitudinal axis.
• The space station exhibits no roll during orbit.
• The system size is within the space station rack space require-
ments.
• Sample sizes dictated by the orientation system do not violate
science requirements.
• Accelerometers of the required resolution and stability become
available.
• 10-3 Hz air drag force variation.
It is recommended that each drive motor be provided with a hand
crank for manual operation of each rotation point in the event of a drive system
failure. The accelerometer package should be located as close as possible to
the furnace module, preferably directly under or over the orientation cradle.
The passive system configuration will be similar to the active system,
but will not require drive motors for the rotation points. Furnace orientation may
be achieved through manual rotation of the gimbal. If the maximum air drag
component is less than 10 -6 g, then orientation capability is required only on
the gravity-gradient alignment axis.
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PHYSICAL ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENTS
FOR AN ACTIVE POSITIONING SYSTEM
, l
Furnace Cradle Assembly
Gimbal Arm
Drive Motors (2)
Accelemmeter Package
Gimbai Support Structure/Rack
10
15
3
10
TBD
Soace Reauirements:
Worst-Case Assumption Based Configuration - 2 Double Racks
Optional Configuration - 1 Double Rack
Power Reauirements:
Drive Motors (2) - 50 W
Accelemmeters (6 at 0,3 w/ea.) - 2 w
Control Electronics - "FBD
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STUDY
• Orientation system space requirements
• Crew assembly and interaction requirements
° Sample exchange problems
• Cost impacts of a furnace module logistics carrier
• Assembly procedures
D-31
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APPENDIX E
SPACE STATION FURNACE FACILITY
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AADSF
ac
AR
ARS
BCD
BER
Brr
BrrE
bps
C
C&T
C&W
CdTe
CCTV
CCZ
CDR
CG
CGF
CHeCS
cm
cm 3
CMDS
Coax
COMMS
CO2
COP
cu.m.
dB
db(A)
DBMS
dc
DDT&E
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Advanced Automated Directional Solidification Furnace
Alternating Current
Atmospheric Revitalization
Atmospheric Revitalization System
Baseline Configuration Document
Bit Error Rate
Built-In Test
Built-In Test Equipment
Bits per Second
Centigrade
Communications and Tracking
Caution and Warning
Cadmium Teludde
Closed Circuit Television
Command and Control Zone
Cdtical Design Review
Center of Gravity
Crystal Growth Furnace
Crew Health Care System
Centimeter
Cubic Centimeter
Commands
Coaxial (cable)
Communications System
Carbon Dioxide
Co-orbiting Ratform
Cubic Meter
Decibel
Decibels Absolute
Data Base Management System
Direct Current
Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation
E-2
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deg
DMS
EAC
ECLSS
ECR
EDCO
EEE
e,g.
EGSE
EHS
EM
EMC
EMI
EPS
ESA
F
FBCC
FDIR
FDS
FMS
fps
FS
FSE
FTS
g
GaAs
GFE
GR
gm
GM'r
GO2
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ABBREVIATIONS (Cont.)
Degree
Data Management System
Experiment Assembly Container
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Engineering Change Request
Extended Duration Crew Operations
Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanicai
For Example
Electrical Ground Support Equipment
Environmental Health Subsystem
oElectromagnetic Energy
Electromagnetic Compatibility
Electromagnetic Interference
Electrical Power System
European Space Agency
Fahrenheit
Full Body Cleansing Compartment
Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery
FireDetection and Suppression
Fluid Management System
Feet per Second
Factor of Safety
Flight Support Equipment
Foot, Feet
Flight Telerobotic Servicer
Force of Gravity
Galium Arsinide
Government-Fumished Equipment
Ground Fault Interrupt
Gram
Greenwich Mean Time
Gaseous Oxygen
E-3
GOX
GPS
"GSE
Hg
HgCdTe
HgZnTe
HMF
HSO
HWFZ
Hz
IAS
IA&V
IFEA
IMS
in.
INS
IOC
IR
IRD
ISF
ISO
IVA
IVS
IWFS
IWS
JSC
kbps
KCAL
kg
kHz
km
KSC
ACRONYMS
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AND ABBREVIATIONS (Cont.)
Gaseous Oxygen
Global Positioning System
Ground Support Equipment
Mercury
Mercury Cadmium Teludde
Mercury Zinc Teludde
Health Maintenance Facility
Habitation/Station Operations
Hot Wail Roat Zone Fumace
Hertz (Cycles per Second)
Internal Audio System
Internal Audio and Video
Integrated Furnace Experiment Assembly
Inventory Management System
Inch
Integrated Nitrogen System
Initial Operational Capability
Infrared
Interface Requirements Document
International Space Facility
Intemati0nal Standard Organization
Intravehicular Activity
Internal Video System
Integrated Waste Fluid System
Integrated Water System
(Lyndon B.) Johnson Space Center
Kilobits per Second
Kilocalories
Kilogram
Kilohertz (Kilocycles per Second)
Kilometer
Kennedy Space Center
E-4
kW
La
LAB
Leq
Ib
LOS
LOX
LSA
LUX
LVLH
MASA
mg
m
m 2
m 3
Max
mbps
MDMS
MEQ
mg
MGSE
rain
MIP
mm
MMO
MMU
MOU
Mr
MS
MSFC
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ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Kilowatt
Level Absolute
Laboratory
Level Equivalent
Pound
Line of Sight
Loss of Signal
Liquid Oxygen
Logistics Support Analysis
One Lumen per Square Meter
Local Vertical/Local Horizontal
Metals and Alloys Solidification Apparatus
Miligram
Meter
Square Meter "
Cubic Meter
Maximum
Megabits per Second
Maintenance Data Management System
Man-equivalent
Milligram
Mechanical Ground Support Equipment
Minimum
Minute
Million Instructions per Second
Millimeter
MSC Maintenance Depot
Manned Maneuvering Unit
Memorandum of Understanding
Milliradian
Margin of Safety
(George C.) Marshall Space Flight Center
E-5
MSIS
MSS
MT
N
N2
NA
NASA
NC
NCRP
NDE
NHB
NIM
nm
NOS
N.R.
NSTS
02
O/A
OASPL
OMA
OMS
OPS
ORU
OS
OSE
OSI
OTV
OWS
PDCA
PDR
PDRD
PHC
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ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Man-Systems Integration Standards
Mobile Servicing System
Mobile Transporter
Newton
Nitrogen
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Noise Criteda
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement
Nondestructive Evaluation
NASA Handbook
Network Interface Manager
Nanometer
Network Operating System
Not Required
National Space Transportation System
Oxygen
Operations/Administrative
Overall Absolute Sound Pressure Level
Operations Management Application
Operations Management System
Operations
Orbit Replaceable Unit
Operating System
Orbital Support Equipment
Open System Interconnection
Orbital Transfer Vehicle
Operations Workstations
Power Distribution and Control Assembly
Preliminary Design Review
Program Definition and Requirements Document
Personal Hygiene Compartment
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ACRONYMS (Cont.)
PHS
PMA
PMAD
PMC
PMMS
PMS
Press
Prox Ops
psi
psia
QA
r
REM
RF
RR
.;AP
SOTS
SD
seo
SI
SM
SMAC
SMM
SOW
SPDM
SPL
SPM
SRM&QA
SRD
SS
SSCB
,_SCBD
Personal Hygiene System
Platform Management Application
Power Management and Distribution
Permanently Manned Capability
Process Materials Management Subsystem
Platform Management System
Pressure
Proximity Operations
Pounds per Square Inch
Pounds per Square Inch Absolute
Quality Assurance
Radian
Roentgen-Equivalent-Man
Radio Frequency
Radio Frequency Interference
Service Access Points
Space Cargo Transportation System
Solar Dynamic
Second
International System of Units
Systems Management
Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations
System and Mission Management
Statement of Work
Special Performance Dexterous Manipulator
Sound Pressure Level
Solar Power Modules
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
System Requirements Documents
Space Station
Space Station Control Board
Space Station Control Board Directive
E-7
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SSFF Safety Hazard Reports
Development of SSF Payload facilities present problems that are unique because of
design requirements for long term operations, contamination, and on-orbit maintenance.
Additional payload problems can be ascribed to: the immaturity of the space program
requirements; immature definition of space station services; and organizational interfaces
that deter maximum utilization of NASA's previous space experience.
In December 1990, there was a joint meeting of MSAD, the STS Payload Safety
Panel, Dr. Bonnie Dunbar, the designated chairman of SSF Payload Safety Panel
(L. Perez), and several NASA centers at Johnson Space Center. This meeting discussed
several common problems including Safety Requirements. Although there were several
good suggestions for facility designs and safety requirements, the principal result was that
safety requirements would be based on NSTS 1700.7B. Based on the SSFF program, the
following concerns and recommendations are provided.
1. Safety Requirements
Safety Requirements are not fully established. There have been several review
issues of requirements issued as: NSTS 1700.7B Addendum 1, NHB 1700.7C, and SSP
30XXX. While much of the proposed requirements are similar, the differences make "final
designs" risky to the development agency.
Recommendation: Establish a unified approach, identify the final safety Arbiter, and
baseline safety requirements.
2. Toxicity
Material processing facilities frequently produce (offgassing or vapors)
products that would be toxic if released into habitable areas. Depending on the degree and
quality of toxic materials, safety requirements mandate a pressure vessel or two or three
levels of containment. On Spacelab missions, the operation of furnaces at a vacuum or
negative pressure (in relation to the module) have been deemed the equivalent of one level
of containment. Because potential contamination problems surround the Space Station,
requirements have been established to ensure that contaminants including toxic gases are
not released into the vacuum vent. This requirement will necessitate an additional
containment level for processing, or a containment system for released products.
Recommendation: Consider the use of filters to enable release of toxic materials into the
vacuum vent line. As currently written, it is doubtful that module air could be vented.

3. ExperienceFactors
NASA hasawealthof knowledgeconcerningprocessingfacility designthathas
beenacquiredin the mannedSpacelabprogram. This experience,though scatteredat
various centers, it principally located at MSFC and JSC. Becausethe experienced
personnelaremostly involvedin Spacelab, there is very limited contact with Space Station.
This experience includes both design and safety.
Recommendation: Develop panels/work groups composed of SL experienced personnel to
meet occasionally with Space Station developers to answer questioning or relate Spacelab
resolution to problems.
Safety Panel:
Implementation of the SS Flight Payload Safety Panel is scheduled for mid to late
1992. There are numerous questions by payload developers that need guidance in design
or interpretation of safety requirements. Early guidance in the interpretation of safety
requirements could save considerable redesign at a later date with attendant costs.
Recommendation: Implement the PSP at the earliest possible date to enable clarification or
interpretations of safety requirements.
The SSFF study effort generated the following Hazard Reports based on the
requirements and protocols defined in Appendix B of NHB 1700.7B (Space Station
Requirements).
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SSFF CONFIGURATION AND MAINTENANCE CONTROL
CONCEPT

1.0 PURPOSE
This document outlines a combined configuration and maintenance control concept for use
in the development of detailed plans during on-orbit operation of the SSFF. Configuration
control is def'med as "The systematic definition, evaluation, coordination, disposition, and
accounting of each proposed change, deviation or waiver and the implementation of each
approved change in the configuration of a program after formal establishment of the
configuration identification". Maintenance control within the context of this concept,
involves considerations associated with changes to SSFF equipment that are of an
immediate nature such that the formal configuration control process will not accommodate
them in a timely enough manner. This concept should serve as an aid during the
development of Configuration and Maintenance Control Plans, such that the following
results will be attained: 1) All personnel concerned with the SSFF or any of it's
subsystems, are working with the latest information and current baseline; 2) all proposed
changes are assessed for technical, safety, reliability, schedule, and resource impacts; and
3) the system configuration retains traceability throughout the on-orbit experiment and/or
mission phases.
2.0 BACKGROUND
System Configuration is maintained through several processes: (1) Configuration
Identification; (2) Configuration Change Control; (3) Configuration Change Status
Accounting; (4) Configuration Audits; (5) Maintenance Control Documentation; and (6)
Recovery of Lost Configuration Control.
2.1 CONFIGURATION IDENTIFICATION
During SSFF conceptual stages, the basic subsystems and components of the system will
be identified. Baseline requirements for these subsystems and components will then be
developed. Baselines are identified by specifications, procedures, and drawings as
approved by the respective program/project manager, at a specific time during its life cycle.
Baselines, plus approved changes, identify the current approved configuration. The
Baseline will identify all engineering drawings, specifications, and requirements
documentation relating to the specific system, subsystem, or component.
2.2 CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL
The baseline will be maintained by procedures that prohibit any revision unless approved
by a formal change control process. All proposed changes to the system design,
replacement/repair of any system component, or change in experiment hardware will
normally begin with submission of a Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) (see Figures 1
and 2). Finalized ECP's will be prepared and sent to Configuration Management (CM) for
entry into an automated tracking system. The Configuration Status Report (CSR) will
reflect all ECP's pending evaluation/disposition. CM will route the ECP to the appropriate
Engineering discipline for evaluation of the proposed change. Engineering assessments
and recommendations will be returned to CM for distribution to affected agencies and all
members of the Configuration Control Board (CCB) at least three days prior to the next
CCB meeting. A formal CCB charter will establish the guidelines for dispositioning the
ECP. The CCB will include multiple technical discipline personnel familiar with the system
and related subsystems. Each technical member of the CCB will evaluate ECPs within
his/her area of technical expertise. Engineering disciplines and Project Management will be
responsible for evaluating design trade studies. When practical the ECP initiator, or
2

designatedrepresentative, will attend the CCB meetings and provide additional input
concerning specific ECPs.
The CCB will perform the following functions:
a. Review the status of each open ECE
b. Request additional analysis or action from Engineering and/or the initiator.
c. Disposition all ECPs.
d. Direct the appropriate Configuration change implementation as:
1) An on-orbit Flight Crew modification;
2) A replacement of Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU);
3) A modification after system or components have completed flight.
e. Document all board dispositioned ECPs on CCB Directives (CCBDs).
Configuration change control will publish agendas, minutes, and directives to ensure that
changes receive appropriate evaluation by technical and management discipline and that
only CCB-approved changes are incorporated into the baseline documentation.
Configuration change control will also maintain and publish the Configuration Status and
Accounting Report (CSAR). Inspections of hardware will be performed to ensure final as
built configuration.
After CCB disposition, the ECP will be returned to CM for implementation or closure. CM
will update the tracking system and prepare the necessary documentation for the next step
in the processing of the ECP. Work Orders (WO) will be prepared by the appropriate
activity for all approved ECP's. Rejected ECP's will be routed back to the initiator. A
revised ECP may be prepared and returned to CM for reconsideration. CM will then either
reroute the amended ECP to the appropriate Engineering discipline, the CCB, or return to
the initiator for additional actions.
A duplicate, functional SSFF system maintained on Earth will provide technical personnel
with a working model of the on-orbit system. The on-Earth system will be used for
reverification efforts, system testing, training, demonstration, and problem investigation.
Configuration changes will be completed and evaluated with the on-Earth system prior to
implementation on-orbit. Additional details are contained in the SSFF Functional
Verification Concept.
2.3 CONFIGURATION CHANGE STATUS ACCOUNTING
CM will maintain a data base of the established baseline, approved changes, and ECP's
pending evaluation and dispositioning. Reports of implemented and pending changes will
be provided to developmental and operational organizations. A master system
configuration document will be developed. This document will provide traceability to all
implemented and pending ECP's. The CSAR will be compatible with existing NASA
requirements and data processing capabilities.
2.4 CONFIGURATION AUDITS
Audits will be conducted during Configuration Control activities to evaluate the design,
progress, approach and status of design, and to verify that SSFF performance complies
with specifications. ECPs may be generated as a result of audits, to ensure that baseline
documentation agrees with "as built" configurations.
3
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2.5 MAINTENANCE CONTROL DOCUMENTATION
Equipment changes of an immediate nature would necessarily fall within the bounds of a
maintenance procedure contained in a maintenance control plan. These changes would be
documented as results of Field Engineering Changes (FECs) (see Figures 1 and 3).
Normally such changes will involve Temporary Changes (TCs), Parts Replacements
(PRs), and Part Repair with no Replacements (RNRs) (see Figures 4, 5, and 6). In all
cases the appropriate configuration control documentation will be updated following
execution of an approved FEe.
2.5.1 TEMPORARY CHANGE (TC)
TCs are implemented when hardware is to be replaced, and a temporary repair or work-
around is necessary to accommodate mission objectives. The process shown in Figure 4
will result both in authorization for the Flight Crew to perform the temporary
modification/repair, as well as direction for the appropriate hardware group to fabricate
replacement hardware. The Change Authority can disapprove and close a TC, or change
the category either to a PR, or a RNR, or return the TC to the originator for reconsideration
and resubmission.
2.5.2 PART REPLACEMENT (PR)
PRs ate directed/required when hardware wear/failure dictates its replacement. If the PR is
approved, the Change Authority normally will determine whether the replacement will take
place on-orbit or after the Fright Unit has been returned to Earth. The PR will remain open
until completion of the hardware replacement. The Change Authority can disapprove and
close the PR, or change the category either to a TC, or a RNR, or return the PR to the
originator for reconsideration and resubmission (see Figure 5).
2.5.3 REPAIR NOT REPLACE (RNR)
RNRs address hardware needing repair, but not replacement. If the RNR is approved, the
Change Authority will determine whether the repair will take place On-orbit or after the
Flight Unit has been returned to Earth. The RNR will remain open until the repair has been
completed. The Change Authority can disapprove and close the RNR, or change the
category either to a TC, or a PR, or return the RNR to the originator for reconsideration
and resubmission (see Figure 6).
2.6 RECOVERY OF LOST CONFIGURATION CONTROL
Some maintenance operations conducted on-orbit may result in a SSFF configuration that
no longer matches the baseline documentation -- configuration control or traceability has
effectively been "lost". In such cases configuration control may be recovered through use
of an equipment log book, or similar document, maintained by the crew while conducting
on-orbit operations. This document should serve to identify discrepancies between actual
and baseline SSFF/subsystem/experiment configurations. CM will process a priority ECP
to correct and update the CAS and configuration documentation when necessary.
4
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3.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Document Number Ta_
320PLN0004
6 September 1991
MM8040.12A
Configuration Management Plan for Space Station
Furnace Facility
Standard Contractor Configuration Management
Requirements, MSFC Programs
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SSFF SAFETY VERIFICATION
CONCEPT
..._.I
1.0 PURPOSE
This document outlines a safety verification program concept for on-orbit reconfigured
hardware or software for the Space Station Furnace Facility (SSFF). The SSFF will fall
under the jurisdiction of three (3) safety organizations: Kennedy Space Center's Payload
Ground Safety Review Panel (PGSRP) will be responsible for all pre and post flight
ground processing; the Space Shuttle Program's Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) at
Johnson Space Center will be responsible for hardware and "operational safety during
wansportation to and from SSF via the Space Shuttle, and the Space Station Freedom
Program Office (SSFPO) Payload Safety Panel (PSP) at Reston, Virginia, will be
responsible for safety of on-orbit operations aboard the SSF. The safety verification
program for SSFF will ensure that on-orbit reconfigured or refurbished SSFF
components, systems, and subsystems do not pose an unacceptable risk to personnel, the
SSE Space Shuttle, other payloads, or ground processing facilities and equipment
2.0 BACKGROUND
As the Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) matures, it will become necessary to
implement plans for safety reverification of recycled or reconfigured payloads and payload
components. SSFP 30595, Space Station Freedom Payload Safety Review Process
provides for safety reviews during payload concept development, preliminary design, final
design, increment integration and planned on-orbit operations. The safety verification
program will include on-orbit changes to the previously approved payload design,
configuration and on-orbit operations, and ensure that hazards associated with such
changes are properly identified and evaluated. Safety reviews are accomplished within the
fran_work provided by the Space Station Freedom (SSF) Payload Safety Review Process
(See Figure 1).
3.0 SSFF SAFETY VERIFICATION
On-orbit configuration changes may be planned or unplanned depending on mission
requirements and situations. All planned configuration changes will be reviewed and
approved through the SSFP 30595, Safety Review Process prior to flight and will enter the
review process at the Phase II stage. This will include an Increment Phase B Review. All
unplanned configuration changes will be coordinated with and approved by the appropriate
payload safety panel(s) prior to implementation. An Increment Phase C Review will be
required, except in the case of changes of a nature that real-time safety verification is
required.
3.1 INCREMENT PHASE C SAFETY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS
The safety data packages for series, reflown, and on-orbit/econfigured SSFF payloads
and/or components will satisfy the Increment Phase C data requirements (See Figure 1).
The following data items will be submitted for review and consideration by the appropriate
payload safety panel(s).
a. An assessment of each SSFF payload component to indicate whether or not the
proposed use is the same as that previously analyzed and documented.
b. Hazard reports generated or revised to include new data and to indicate open/closed
status.
c. A review and reevaluation of any previous noncompliances reports.
.....t
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d. A report concerning life cycle limits for critical and limited life SSFF components.
e. A description of maintenance, structural inspection and refurbishment activities for
the hardware, and an assessment of safety impact.
f. A description of any software changes and an assessment of safety impact.
g. An updated listing of chemical, organisms, and radioisotopes with quantities and
concentrations.
h. An assessment of failures and anomalies during previous SSFF usage, with
corrective actions and status.
i. A new, signed Certification of SSFP Payload Safety Compliance (See Figure 2 and
3).
Table 1 contains a partial listing of hazard examples both for on-orbit (flight) as well as
ground processing operations.
Close contact and cooperation with the appropriate payload safety panel(s) will be
maintained during their review of the above items to facilitate formal safety reverification by
the panel(s).
3.2 REAL-TIME SAFETY VERIFICATION
On-orbit safety verification, and recertification of the SSFF payload may be required
following unplanned operational changes, unplanned re.configurations, all maintenance or
service activities, and/or the occurrence of anomalies that have a potential safety impact.
Unplanned operational changes and reconfigurations include hardware and software
modifications, payload mission changes, and operational procedure revisions.
Modifications will include resupply items such as material processing samples or furnaces
whose design, materials or construction are different from those provided for operations in
an otherwise previously verified and certified SSFF payload. On-orbit modifications will
be verified to the original criteria on the ground to the maximum extent possible. SSFF
Payload operations and activities will be terminated when constrained by safety-related
verifications until closeout is finalized.
SSFF payloads remaining on SSF at the end of an increment must be reassessed for
possible recertification of operations on the next increment. If there are no changes (i.e.,
design, operations, environment, etc.) recertification for the next increment may be attained
by updating and resubmitting the original certification. For purposes of this discussion, the
SSFF payload, integrated rack hardware, and interfaces which affect safety are included.
The POIC is responsible for coordinating all SSFF payload operations. The SSF PSP has
delegated responsibility to the SSF PAI function to conduct the Phase D Safety Assessment
(see SSP 30595) in support of the POIC. As part of this assessment, the POIC and PAI
must evaluate all unplanned on-orbit operational changes, maintenance activities, etc., for
safety implications. Whenever on-orbit safety verification and possibly recertification is
under consideration, the POIC will coordinate with the PSP via the SSF PAI function's
safety representative supporting the POIC before taking action. The PAI function will in
turn have support available from the organization(s) having responsibility for the original
SSFF design and operations verification and certification, including the payload developer.
At the completion of all on-orbit verification activities, the PAI safety representative will
complete the Increment Payload Complement Verification Tracking Log and incorporate the
Log into the Increment Safety Data files.
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4.0 DEFINITIONS
Catastrophic Hazard - Any condition which may cause a permanent or fatal personnel
injury, or loss of one of the following: The launch or servicing vehicle, manned base, any
NSTS cargo element, the loss of which could result in the loss of the manned base; major
ground facility; or critical support equipment..
Certificate of Safety Compliance A formal written statement attesting that the
payload is safe and that all safety requirements have been met and, if not, what waivers and
deviations are applicable.
Component - A combination of parts, devices, and structure - usually self-contained -
that performs a distinctive function in the operation of the overall equipment.
Critical Hazard - Any condition which may cause a serious personnel injury; severe
occupational illness; loss of safety monitoring, emergency control function or an
emergency system, or requires the use of emergency procedures; or involves major damage
to one of the following: The launch or servicing vehicle, manned base, any NSTS cargo
element, which could result in the loss of, or major damage to a major SSF dement; on-
orbit life sustaining function, a ground facility, or critical support equipment.
Deviation Granted use or acceptance of a payload aspect which does not meet the
specified requirements. The intent of the requirement should be satisfied and a comparable
or higher degree of safety should be achieved.
Hazard - The presence of a potential risk situation caused by an unsafe act or condition.
A condition or changing set of circumstances that presents a potential for adverse or
harmful consequences; or the inherent characteristics of an activity, condition, or
circumstance, which can produce adverse or harmful consequences.
Hazard Report (HR) - A report that documents the hazard rifle, description, causes,
controls, verifications, and status of a hazard analysis for a specific potentially hazardous
condition/situation.
Noncompliance Report - A report documenting a condition in which a requirement
cannot be met. It is the report used to request a waiver or deviation.
Payload Any equipment or material carried by the Space Shuttle or used on the SSF
that is not considered part of the basic assemblage itself. It, therefore, includes items such
as free-flying automated spacecraft, individual experiments or instruments, and increment
dependent equipment. It also includes payload-provided GSE and systems and flight and
ground systems software.
Payload Life - The period of time that a payload is expected to be operating. The SSF
Safety Certification will be for the planned mission life of the payload or payload
component. Modifications to payload missions, mission life, or configuration will be
reviewed by the appropriate safety panel(s).
Safety Freedom from those conditions that cause injury or death to personnel and
damage or loss of equipment or property.
Safing - Actions which eliminate or control hazards.
4
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Verification - Proof by inspection and/or analysis and/or test that the payload items in
question perform to design specifications and does in fact control the identified hazard(s).
Waiver - Granted use or acceptance of a payload aspect which does not meet the
specified requirements; a waiver is given or authorized for one mission only. Safety
waivers will include acceptance of increased risk.
5.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
KHB 1700.7A Space Transportation System Payload Ground Safety Manual
NSTS 1700.7B Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Shuttle
Transportation System
SSFP 30595 Space Station Freedom Payload Safety Review Process
SSP 30652
(NSTS 1700.7B
Addendum 1)
SSFP Payload Safety Requirements for On-Orbit Operations
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CERTIFICATE OF SSFP PAYLOAD SAFETY
COMPLIANCE
FOR
(Payload)
PAYLOAD DESIGN AND ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS.
THE PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT:
(1) THE PAYLOAD IS SAFE
(2) THE PAYLOAD COMPLIES WITH ALL APPLICABLE
REQUIREMENTS OF SSP 30652.
LIST OF APPROVED WAIVERS / DEVIATIONS
APPROVA_
Payload Development Organization
PAl Function
DATE:
FIGURE 2. CERTIFICATE OF PAYLOAD SAFETY COMPLIANCE
7
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rCERTIFICATE OF SSFP INCREMENT PAYLOAD
COMPLEMENT SAFETY COMPLIANCE
FOR
i
(Increment).
INCREMENT DESIGN AND ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS
THE INCREMENT MANAGER HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT:
(1) THE INCREMENT PAYLOAD COMPLEMENT IS SAFE.
(2) THE INCREMENT PAYLOAD COMPLEMENT COMPLIES
WITHALL APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS OF SSP 30652.
UST OF APPROVED WAIVERS / DEVIATIONS
APPROVED: (Manager of the Increment) DATE:
FIGURE 3. CERTIFICATE OF INCREMENT PAYLOAD SAFETY COMPLIANCE
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TABLE 1. HAZARD EXAMPLES
GENERIC HAZARDS
"nILE
Electrical Shock
Ignition Sources
EMI
SAMPLE CONTROLS
Bonding and grounding per appl directives
Bleed down circuitry if needed
High voltage sources inaccessible to crew
Interlocks provided where necessary
Equipment grounded to facility ground (GSE)
Wiring/fusing selected to protect down-stream
wiring in accord with appl directives
Inaccessibility or isolation of high temperature
surfaces/equipment to flammable equipment
Equipment designed such that conducted and
radiated emissions do not exceed allowables
Sharp Comers/FAges/Protrusions
Toxic Offgassing
Hammable Materials
Structural Failure
Pressure Systems (Ground Ops)
Hardware designed per appl requirements
Materials selected per appl directives
Equipment built per approved materials lists
Assemblies offgas tested
Materials approved by appl office
Non-metallic materials meet appl requirements
Materials approved by appl office
Safety critical structure designed per appl criteria
Design based on fracture control criteria
Positive locking for threaded fasteners as neces
Materials approved by appl office
Safety critical structure built per approved dwgs
GSE designed per appl requirements
Flight systems designed per appl criteria
GSE pressure vessels designed to ASME
GSE systems designed such that pressure cannot
be trapped in any part of system without bleed
capability
GSE systems proof tested to 1.5 X MOP
UNIQUE HAZARDS
FLIGHT HAZARD EXAMPLES
Exposure of Crew to Broken Glass or Frangible Materials
Release of Toxic or Noxious Gas into Habitable Atmosphere
Containment of Flammable Fluids
Fragmentation or Failure of Rotating Equipment
Explosion/Rupture of Batteries
9
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FLIGHT HAZARD EXAMPLES (CONT)
Contamination Because of Battery Eleclrolyte Leakage
Electrical Shock from Biomedical Instrumentation System
Improperly Stowed Equipment
Untethered Experiment Apparatus
Hazardous Touch Temperature
Exposure of Crew to Pathogenic Micro-Organisms
Containment of Stored Energy (Springs)
Explosion/Rupture of Pressure Systems
Contamination Because of Release of Mercury
Loss of Breathable Atmosphere
Use of Toxic Materials
Eye Injury as a Result of Exposure to Laser or Other High-intensity Light
Overtemperature/Fire Resulting from Runaway Furnace or Heater
Loss of Cooling
Impediment m Emergency Egress
Use of Radioactive Materials
Containment of Toxic Experiment Samples
Loss of Safety Critical Equipment
GROUND HAZARD EXAMPLES
Use of Radioactive Materials
Release of Toxic Gases during Ground Operations
Use of Lasers/High-intensity Light Causes Eye Damage
Oxygen Displacement in Confined Areas
Containment and Handling of Cryogenic Fluids
Use of Spark (Ignition) Sources in Equipment Adjacent to Orbiter or Propellant
Systems
Explosion/Rupture of Batteries
Containment of Mercury
Handling/Operations using Biological Specimens
Use of Flammable Fluids during Ground Operations :
Premature Actuation of PyrotechnicDevices
Exposure of Ground Crew to Rotating Devices
10
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SSFF FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION
CONCEPT
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1.0 PURPOSE
The purpose of this concept is to present considerations for use during development of a
detailed plan for the functional verification of the SSFF following changes to flight
hardware during on-orbit operations aboard SSE
2.0 BACKGROUND
The objective of the verification process is to ensure the acceptability and readiness of
deliverable hardware and software for its intended use. The verification process will
include:
a.
b.
C°
Support of design development.
Conftrmation that all system products meet established
requirements.
Confwmation that the performance of combined elements
meets established requirements.
The goals of the SSFF verification program shall be compatible with the goals of the SSF
verification program which are to:
a°
b.
C.
d*
Integrate the hardware and software at the lowest level.
Utilize SSF-supplied equipment for integration and testing.
Utilize the same precedures and plans for verification from development to
operational support.
Use flight procedures that have been proven during ground test ops.
Tradeoffs between ground and on-orbit verification shall be made; however, as a
minimum, mission or safety critical subsystems/systems shall be ground-verified prior to
launch. Appendix I graphically shows the Verification/Reverification Process Flow. The
on-orbit, first time verification of subsystems/systems shall be limited to
subsystems/systems that are not mission or safety critical per SSP 30467, Volume 1, or
verification that can only be performed on-orbit. Verifications shall be assessed by safety
to ensure that the verification process does not result in hazards. Such verification shall
require Space Station Conlrol Board (SSCB) approval.
3.0 SSFF FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION/REVERIFICATION
Functional verification of the integrated SSFF flight unit shall be accomplished by testing
and/or demonstration, and shall be augmented by analyses/assessments and possibly
inspections. Functional reverification of hardware/software shall be required as follows:
a.
b.
C°
Subsequent to modification of previously verified hardware or software.
Following repair, configuration changes, or replacement of
hardware/software.
Subsequent to remate of previously verified mated connections or physical
interfaces.
=.J
d.
e°
f.
Prior to initiating hazardous or mission critical operations.
(Assess system risk. See Exhibit I. Class 1 is defined as crew/vehicle critical
systems. Class 2 is defined as mission (payload) critical systems. Class 3
is defined as support systems.)
Following the incorporation of growth elements into a previously verified
system.
For functional paths not normally used (at periodic intervals).
Different verification methods are required for the three different system risk classifications
as identified above in requirement d. Product assurance is required for all three classes.
Verification and validation is required for classes two and three which include mission
(payload) critical and support systems. Independent verification and validation is required
for class one which includes crew/vehicle critical systems. See section 4.0 for definitions
of the different verification methods.
After system risk assessment has been accomplished, performance/design requirements
must be taken into account in determining verification requirements and for establishing
verification procedures/methods. After verification methods are established, analysis/test
objectives/conditions are established prior to development of the ground and on-orbit
verification plan and implementation of the ground verification plan.
Evaluation of ground verification results with respect to requirements and resulting
modifications of design or performance requirements shall precede implementation of on-
orbit verification plans. Before verification requirements can be confmned, additional
modifications of design or performance requirements may be necessary. A Verification
Completion Notice (VCN) system shall be employed to document final compliance with the
verification requirements.
Full utilization shall be made of reflown elements whenever possible and/or practicable.
Subsystems performance data from the preceding flight shall be provided to verify system
performance and minimize ground checkout requirements for their next flight.
Orbital Replacement Units (ORU's) removed from a reflown element for field maintenance
shall be reverified prior to reinstallation in the element. Functional verification of the
affected paths within each ORU shall suffice when the repair involves replacement of plug-
in assemblies only. Repair involving more than assembly replacement (e.g. soldering,
potting) shall necessitate complete functional verification testing of the ORU including
environmental acceptance testing when applicable.
Examples of typical areas requiring verification, along with several corresponding
Verification Requirement Definition Sheets (VRDSs) are shown in Appendix B. A
complete listing is contained in SS-HDBK-0002.
4.0 DEFINITIONS
Verification - A process wherein a determination is made that products conform to the
design specifications and are free from manufacturing and workmanship defects. Areas to
be considered during this process include performance, safety, reaction to design limits,
fault tolerance, and error recovery. Encompassed within the verification process are
analysis, testing, inspection, demonstration, or a combination thereof.

Analysis - A verificationmethodutilizinganalyticaltechniquesandtools,such as math
models, data compilation, similarity assessments, and validation of records, to confirm that
requirements have been met.
Testing - A method of verification wherein performance requirements are measured during
or after the controlled application of functional and environmental stimuli. These
measurements may require the use of laboratory equipment such as thermal probes, furnace
borescopes, and mini-gloveboxes, recorded data, procedures, test support items, or
services.
Inspection - A method of verification of physical characteristics that determines
compliance. Inspection uses visual methods, gauges, etc., to verify compliance with
requirements of construction features, documents and drawings, workmanship, physical
condition, and service code.
Demonstration - A method of verification denoting the qualitative determination of
properties of an end item or component by observation of functional characteristics.
Demonstration is used with or without special test equipment or instrumentation to verify
requirement characteristics such as operational performance, human engineering fea.tures,
service and access features, transportability, and displayed data.
On-Orbit Demonstrations - Performed to verify capability of SSF and SSFF s_stems
during the following:
a°
b.
d.
4.
Initial buildup and assembly.
Final verification and demonstration of readiness to support operations.
Routine maintenance and repair.
Installation of update and growth items.
Product Assurance - A program for providing validation of the life cycle processes for
SSF and SSFF systems and components. This validation assures that processes are
approved and that appropriate controls are used within the life cycle. Process designs shall
be evaluated to verify that appropriate subprocesses and controls are selected. The
acceptance and operation of processes shall be monitored to assure that they are
accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and that process components and
systems comply with requirements.
Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) - Processes that are accomplished
through an organization independent of the development organization, to ensure that a
complete and objective evaluation of the developer's products is accomplished.
Organizational separation may be to a high level within an organization, contract, or
company or by assigning the task to an organization, contract, or company other than the
developer. The degree and extent of IV&V separation shall be a management decision
made when system/component development or acquisition is initiated.
Validation - A process that determines that products comply with requirements and meet
user needs. Validation ensures that each product reflects an accurate interpretation and
execution of requirements and meets a level of functionality and performance that is
acceptable to users.
_ 4
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5.0 REFERENCE
Document Number
SSP 30467, Vol. 1
Revision C
October 1991
SSP 30467, Vol. 2
Revision A
January 15, 1989
SS-HDBK-0002
January 20, 1992
(Coordination Copy)
DOCUMENTS
T_
Master Verification Requirements
Master Verification Implementation Requirements
Integration Requirements on Payloads
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APPENDIX A
VERIFICATION/REVERIFICATION PROCESS FLOW
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APPENDIX B
VERIFICATION EXAMPLES

Coordination Copy
TABLE B3-1. SSF PAYLOAD VERIFICATION
(Sheet 1 of 4)
REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENT
IDENTIFICATION-
NUMBER
REQUIREMENT
TITLE
* METHOD OF
VERIFICATION
B3.1.1.1
B3.1.1.2
B3.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL
i
B3.1.1 MASS
Weight
Center of Gravity
T
A&T
B3.1.2.1
B3.1.2.2
B3.1.2.3
B3.1.2.4
B3.1.2.5
B3.1.2.6
133.1.2.7
B3.1.2.8
B3.1.2.9
B3.1.2.10
B3.1.2.11
B3.1.2.12
133.1.2.13
B3.1.2.14
B3.1.2.15
B3.1.2.16
B3.1.2.17
B3.1.2.18
B3.1.2.19
B3.1.2.20
B3.1.2.21
B3.1.2.22
B3.1.2.23
B3.1.2.24
B3.1.2.25
B3.1.2.26
B3.1.2.27
B3.1.2.28
B3.1.2 MECHANICAL
Geometry
Connection/Bolt Hole Location
Attachment Hardware
Surface Alignment and Finish
Captive Parts
Sharp Edges i
Equipment Adjustments
Mechanical Stops
Relatching
Relief/Vent Valves Sizing
Equipment Jettison
Equipment Deployment
Mechanical Energy
Time-Sensitive Items
Handling Clearances
Non-Right Equipment Removal
Restraint of Stowage Equipment
Containment of Materials
Displays and Controls
Passive Thermal Protection Interfaces
Acoustic Levels
Coolant Loop Cleanliness
Coolant Loops Leakage
Equipment Vacuum Vent Constraints
Vacuum Vent Quick-Disconnect :
Vent Valve Functions
Securing of Threaded Fasteners
Pressure/Vacuum Line Identification
A
A
A
A&T
A&T
A&T
A&T
or A&T
A&T
A
A&T
A&T
A
or A&T
I
Aorl
T
T
T
A ofT
AorT
A&T
IorT
I
* T = TEST, A = ANALYSIS, I = INSPECTION
B3-2 Coordination Copy 1/17/92
PREIBEDtNG PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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Coordination Copy
TABLE B3-1. SSF PAYLOAD VERIFICATION
(Sheet2of4)
REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENT
IDENTIFICATION-
NUMBER
REQUIREMENT
TITLE
* METHOD OF
VERIFICATION
B3.1.3.1
B3.1.3.2
B3.1.3.3
B3.1.3.4
B3.1.3.5
B3.1.3.6
B3.1.3.7
B3.1.3.8
B3.1.3.9
133.1.3 STRUCTURES
Structural Safety Factors
Lines and Fittings
Pressure Tank, Actuating Cylinders,
Valves, Filters, and Switches
Natural Frequency
Design Loading Life Spectrum
Crew-Applied Loads
Space Station Design Compatibility
Pressurization/Depressurization
Drawing Compliance for Safety-Critical
Structures
A or A&T
A&T
A&T
A or A&T
A&I
A or A&T
A
A or A&T
I
B3.1.4.1
B3.1.4.2
B3.1.4.3
B3.1.4.4
B3.1.4.5
B3.1.4.6
B3.1.4.7
B3.1.4.8
B3.1.4.9
B3.1.4 MATERIALS
Toxic Offgassing
Flammability, Nonmetallic Materials
Stress Corrosion
Forbidden Matenais
Contamination Sources
Surface Cleanliness
Cooling Fluid Compatibility
Safety-Critical Structure Matedal
Certification
Thermal Vacuum Stability
T
A&I
A&I
A&I
A
A&I
A
I
AorA&T
° T = TEST, A = ANALYSIS, I = INSPECTION
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TABLE B3-1, SSF PAYLOAD VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
(Sheet 3 of 4)
REQUIREMENT
IDENTIRCATION- REQUIREMENT
NUMBER TITLE
* METHOD OF
VERIFICATION
B3,2 EJ.E.C_BICJ¢
B3.2,1.1
B3.2.1.2
B3.2,1.3
B3.2,1.4
B3.2.1.5
B3.2,1,6
B3.2.1.7
B3.2.1.8
B3.2.1.9
133.2.1.10
B3.2.1,11
B3.2.1.12
B3.2.1.13
B3.2.1.14
B3.2.1,15
B3.2,1.16
B3.2.1,17
B3.2.1 FJ.ECTRICAL POWER AND NETWORKS
J
Cable Continuity
Isolation
Secondary Return Grounding
Incoming Signal and Return Lines Isolation
Outgoing Signal Reference
Twisted Multiconductor Shielding
Shield Termination •
Coax Termination
Case Electrical Bonding
Cable Length .'
Cable Types
Connector Type/Wke Size
Cable Interlace Labeling
Power Draw
Overcurrent Protection
Safety-Cdt_al Circuits
Caution and Warning Devices
T
T
T
T
A
I
I
I
A&I or T&I
I
I
A&I
I
A&T
A
A&T
T
B3.2.2.1
B3.2.2.2
B3.2.2 ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY
Conducted EMI Emissions
Radiated EMI Emissions
T
T
B3.2.3.
133.2.3 PYROTECHNIC CIRCUITS
Pyrotechnic Initiators A&I
* T = TEST, A = ANALYSIS, I = INSPECTION
Ol_lflkl, L PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY B3-4 Coordination Copy
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TABLE B3-1. SSF PAYLOAD VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
(Sheet 4 of 4)
REQUIREMENT
IDENT1RCATION- REQUIREMENT
NUMBER TITLE
° METHOD OF
VERIFICATION
B3,3,1
B3.3.2
B3.3.3
B3.3.4
B3.3.5
B3.3.6
B3.3 DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSY'rEMS/SOFTWARE
MDM Interface
Expedment-to-Payload Bus Interfaces
High Rate Data Unk (HRDL) Interface
Video System Interface
Experiment Software Verification
Time Distribution Bus (TDB) Interface
A&T
A&T
A&T
' A&T
A&T
A&T
B3.4.1
B3.4.2
B3.4.3
B3.4.4
B3.4.5
B3.4.6
B3.4.7
133.4 THERMAL/ECLS
Rack Equipment Pressure Drop
Preintegrated Rack Pressure Drop
Touch Temperature /.
Allowable Heat Rejection
Equipment Dewpoint (Right)
Loss of Cooling
Equipment Dewpoint (Ground)
T
T
A
A&T
A
A or A&T
A
B3.5.1
B3.5.2
B3.5.3
B3.5.4.
B3.5.5
B3 5.6
B3.5.7
B3.5 EXPERIMENT CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT (ECE)
ECE Circuit Protection
GSE Structural Design
ECE Fluid Systems Design
ECF_JGSE Connector Interfaces
GSE Fluid Line Marking
GSE Electrical Return Line Isolation
GSE Test Monitoring Cable
A&T
A&T
A&T
I
I
A&T
A&T
* T = TEST, A = ANALYSIS, I = INSPECTION
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iTracking Number
Coordination Copy
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT
SHEET
Requirement No.
B3.1.2.6
Verification Requirement:
Requirement Title
SHARP EDGES
DEFINITION Payload Element
Method
Verify that sharp edges have been removed from equipment access_le to the crew.
Description of Requirement:
Sharp edges or protuberances that could injure flight or ground personnel during normal operations should
be removed or shielded.
Data Required:
1. Stamped certificate of inspection for as-built hardware
2. Design drawings, parts list, waivers, and deviations as applicable
3. Drawings shall specify sharp edge and burr removal.
Applicable Documents and Notes:
NASA-STD-3000
SSP 30XXX, par. 220.7
NSTS 21000-1DD-MDK (Middeck Only)
Responsible Person:
(Technical Resopnslblllty)
Org:
Phone No: Data Submittal Date:
B3 -1 3
P_EI_G
Coordination Copy 1/17/92
P/IGE BLANK NOT FILMED
II
Tracking Number
Requirement No.
B3.1.2.9
Coordination Copy
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT
SHEET
Requirement Title
RELATCHING
DEFINITION Payload Element
Method
AandT
Verification Requirement:
Verify that equipment that requires relatching can be relatched under mission flight environments.
Description of Requirement:
The as-built relatching devices must conform to applicable drawings and specifications and must be capable
of reliable ac_vation in the flight envimnmenL The unique characteristics of the low-g, vacuum, and thermal
environments must be specifically addressed in the analysis. Redundant or backup systems must be verified
to the same degree as primary systems. As a minimum, the latches must be tested in 1-g ambient
environment.
Data Required:
1. Analysis Report
2. Certified Test Report
3. Drawings (installation/layout), waivers, and deviations as applicable
Applicable Documents and Notes:
K;D
MSFC-STD- 1299
NSTS 21000-1DD-MDK (Middeck Only)
Responsible Person:
(Technical Resopnslbillty)
Org:
0 ne No:
Data Submittal Date: ,,
B3 -1 6 Coordination Copy 1/17/92
PREQEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
J
Coordination Copy
Tracking Number VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT DEFINITION
SHEET
Requirement No. Requirement Title
B3.1.2.28 PRESSURE/VACUUM LINE IDENTIFICATION
Verification Requirement:
Verify the proper labeling/color coding and identification of pressure and vacuum lines.
Payload Element
Method
Description of Requirement:
The labeling/color coding and identification of pressure and vacuum lines must agree with the as-built
drawings and must conform to the specifications in MSFC-STD-530/1.
• ;fJ
Data Required:
Certified inspection report
Applicable Documents and Notes:
MSFC-STD-530/1
Responsible Person: Org:
(Technical Resopnsibillty)
Phone No: Data Submittal Date:
B3 - 3 5 Coordination Copy
PREOE'Otf_ P__:,E BLANK
1/17/92
NOT FILMED
t
J
Tracking Number
Requirement No.
B3.1.3.6
Coordination Copy
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT
SHEET
Requirement Title
CREW-APPLIED LOADS
Verification Requirement:
Verify capability of equipment to withstand crew-applied loads.
DEFINITION Payload Element
Method
AorAandT
Description of Requirement:
Determine by stress analysis, using appropriate factors of safety, the capability of all equipment that has a
potential interface with the crew for operation, use, or impact (whether inadvertent or not) to withstand the
crew-applied loads defined in theelement Accommodation Handbooks, without surface penetration, failure
of line/fittings, or failure of safety-critical structural items.
.°
, °,
Data Required:
1. Design drawings, parts list, waivers, and deviations as applicable
2. Detailed stress analysis to include reference to discussion of assumptions/methology, description of
computer models, margins of safety summary, and material properties summary
3. Safety-critical structures identification list with appropriate safety-critical structures analysis
4. Certified test report (If applicable)
Applicable Documents and Notes:
MSFC-HDBK-505
K;D
SSP 30XXX, par. 208
NSTS 21000-1DD-MDK (Middeck Only)
Responsible Person:
(Technical Resopnsibillty)
Org:
Phone No: Data
B3 -4 1
Submittal Date:
Coordination Copy 1/17/92
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